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There is no fuller or better discussion of the subject of privileged
communication between lawyer and client than in Dean Wigmore’s treatise
on evidence. . . . No summary of his arguments will do them justice, and I
accordingly incorporate by reference his entire statement of the case for
and against the privilege. The book is generally available. It is inconceivable
that where there are lawyers there is no copy of Wigmore. Chi non ha
Wigmoro, non vada al foro.1

***
The attorney-client privilege has become one of the most complex and
therefore, litigated privileges. This is due, in significant part, to the
difficulties created by the concept of confidentiality. From the creation and
preservation of the privilege, to the development of the facts to prove the
legitimacy of the claim, the requirement of confidentiality has created timeconsuming and costly responsibilities for both litigants and judges. In
addition, confidentiality has been interpreted as imposing a superfluous
secrecy requirement that has generated conflicting decisions and practices.
The concept of confidentiality and secrecy was literally made up by
Wigmore in the first edition of his treatise.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a rather famous fresco on the dome of American Capitol
rotunda entitled The Apotheosis of Washington, depicting George
Washington, the general and then first president of the nation, being
admitted into the firmament by the deities Victory and Liberty,
surrounded by the Olympian gods demonstrating the accomplishments of
the nation in their respective spheres.3 Neptune, for example, symbolizes
America’s maritime power, with Venus at hand laying the first
transatlantic telegraph cable; Vulcan likewise mechanical industry; Ceres,
Flora, and Pomona, agriculture; Mercury, commerce; and Minerva, the
sciences.4 This last goddess is syncretized with Athena in the Greek
pantheon, whose greatest temple was the still-extant Parthenon of
1. Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 490 n.11 (1928) (brackets in quotation omitted). Loosely
translated, Radin’s rhyming couplet in Italian reads: “If you don’t have Wigmore, don’t
go to court.” This author feels obligated to add retrospectively as to Radin’s use of
“inconceivable”: “VIZZINI: He didn’t fall? Inconceivable! / INIGO: (whirling on Vizzini)
You keep using that word—I do not think it means what you think it means.” THE
PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications et al. 1987); see also WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE
PRINCESS BRIDE 106-08 (30th anniv. ed. 2007).
2. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion about Attorney
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts
Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 968 & n.5 (1999) [hereinafter Rice, Continuing
Confusion].
3. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS &
CAPITOL: A WALKING TOUR HANDBOOK 54 (U.S. Sen. 1999); see also CHARLES B. REYNOLDS,
WASHINGTON: THE NATIONAL’S CAPITAL 31 (B.S. Reynolds Co. 2d ed. 1921) (providing
descriptions and illustrations).
4. Id.
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Athens, named after her appellation Parthenos, a reference to her
perennial virginity.5 Perhaps in Parthenos, there is also some allusion to
Athena’s birth, as she was said to have sprung fully formed and armed for
war from the head of her father, Zeus.6
Like Athena’s nativity, parthenogenesis refers straightforwardly to
the biological phenomenon of “[r]eproduction without concourse of
opposite sexes or union of sexual elements,” figuring in Charles Darwin’s
Origin of Species to describe this rather non-evolutionary method of
procreation.7 The law is no stranger to the similarities between
evolutionary biology and the development of the law.8 Indeed, judges
have understood legal parthenogenesis to be the invocation of a new
doctrine ex nihilo as the non-evolutionary product of a jurist’s mind
rather than the evolutionary accumulation of precedent.9 The concept
seems to have proven particularly salient where the unprecedented
development diverges sharply from all that went before, as with one court
observing with confusion that “with every sign from that [Supreme] Court
pointing in the diametrically opposite direction, one gropes to
understand by what strange process of parthenogenesis or genetic
mutation the notion ever sprang up. The genealogy is bizarre.”10 Or as
another panel of the same appellate court wrote in 2005 of a similarly
unprovenanced innovation, “it is unquestionably nothing more than a
wish-fulfillment fantasy, ideational parthenogenesis, a product of
spontaneous combustion—like Athena springing fully armed from the
brow of Zeus.”11
5. See Louise Anne May, Above Her Sex: The Enigma of the Athena Parthenos, in 3
VISIBLE RELIGION 106, 111 (Leiden, Netherlands, E.J. Brill Publ. 1984); see also THOMAS
BULFINCH, THE AGE OF FABLE OR, BEAUTIES OF MYTHOLOGY 18, 149-50 (Boston, George C.
Rand & Avery 1855).
6. See May, supra note 5, at 110; see also BULFINCH, supra note 5, at 18.
7. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1278, parthenogenesis, noun sense 1 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. (compact) 1989) (citing Darwin’s usage of 1859).
8. See Jared S. Sunshine, A Lazarus Taxon in South Carolina: A Natural History of
National Fraternities’ Respondeat Superior Liability for Hazing, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 79,
118-119 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Leechburg Area Sch. Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579, 585-86 (W.D.
Pa. 1970) (“We believe there is not, unless it can be derived (like contraception) by the
process of cerebral parthenogenesis from primeval darkness and a vague
constitutional continuum without form and void. This task should not be performed
by a court of first instance.” (citation omitted)); see also Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d
392, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1987) (“However, we are convinced that our decision in Allison
was not an innovation produced by a process of ‘cerebral parthenogenesis,’ but a
logical interpretation derived from careful scrutiny of the language and legislative
history of the statute.” (quoting Lovelace)); cf. U.S. v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1439 n.19
(8th Cir. 1987) (“A verdict of guilty under a proper instruction requiring proof of a
certain element of the offense does not supply or create, as if by automatic
parthenogenesis, the necessary evidence to prove that element of the offense. Such
evidence must be contained in the record.”); Schmitt v. Maryland, 779 A.2d 1004, 1019
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (“[T]he public usage almost certainly remains that someone
else must provide a defendant with an alibi. He does not, by some sort of exculpatory
parthenogenesis, produce one for himself.”).
10. Tabbs v. Maryland, 43 Md. App. 20, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
11. Adams v. Maryland, 885 A.2d 833, 870 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
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Such nomenclature, “ideational parthenogenesis,” well describes a
prominent invention in the law of privilege by John Henry Wigmore,
undoubtedly the most eminent writer on the Anglo-Saxon law of evidence
by virtue of his seminal Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law first published in 1904 to 1905.12 Prior to Wigmore, there
was little hint that attorney-client communications had to be zealously
guarded as secret in order to maintain their protections.13 But Wigmore
fabricated just such a requirement of confidentiality, as this author has
previously written:14
Yet the provenance of that most thorny condition for privilege,
confidentiality, is decidedly obscure prior to Wigmore.15 What historical
evidence exists anent confidentiality in attorney-client communications
suggests it was a weapon in the hands of clients, intended to allow them to
compel counsel to protect their secrets, rather than a latent landmine
waiting to obliterate their privilege at the casual slip of a tongue.16 No less
an authority than Paul R. Rice has observed that it seems to have sprung
Athena-like fully formed17 from the head of Dean Wigmore himself,
establishing itself by virtue of the Dean’s preeminence rather than doctrinal
underpinnings or legal precedent.18 This is consistent with the 1924
observation that “[w]hen the first edition was published, it was only
possible to judge of Mr. Wigmore’s book as a statement of the law. During
the intervening years it has become something greater. It has created
law.”19 Indeed, “once he had perpetrated a doctrine on the basis of little or
12. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1905).
13. See infra Section II-C.
14. Jared S. Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag: A Decennial Assessment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 502's Impact on Forfeiture of Legal Privilege under Customary
Waiver Doctrine, 68 CLEV, ST. L. REV. 637, 646-47 (2020) (internal citations preserved).
15. See Michael Correll, The Troubling Ambition of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d),
77 MO. L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2012); see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 2,
at 968 nn.2-5; PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:3
(Thomson Reuters ed. 2018) [hereinafter RICE, ACPITUS].
16. Paul R. Rice, Attorney Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 868-72 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding
Concept]; see Jared S. Sunshine, Clients, Counsel, and Spouses: Case Studies at the
Uncertain Junction of the Attorney-Client and Marital Privileges, 81 ALB. L. REV. 489, 54748 (2017) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1071-72 (1978); and Max Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 487
(1928)); Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common
Interest in the D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 833, 834-35 (2016) (discussing Hazard
and Radin articles at length); Correll, supra note 15, at 1035-37; Rice, Continuing
Confusion, supra note 2, at 968.
17. See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 7, 107 (1913).
18. See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 2, at 968 & n.5 (“The concept of
confidentiality and secrecy was literally made up by Wigmore in the first edition of his
treatise.”); see also Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 16, at 861-63; RICE, ACPITUS,
supra note 15; see also Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 16, at 547; Correll,
supra note 15, at 1035-36.
19. Zechariah Chafee Jr., A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 513, 521 (1924) (book review) (cited in Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Introduction to the Treatise: The New Wigmore in Perspective, in THE
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no authority, precedents would soon follow to fill the gap.”20 Thus by the
latter half of the twentieth century, the requirement of confidentiality was
well established as a prerequisite for privilege.21

What follows is an attempt to coax from the vagaries and vapors of
history some explanation of just how Wigmore managed this magic trick.
The attorney-client privilege has been recognized in some form since well
before the days of Cicero under the Roman Republic,22 and thus there is
ample fodder for analysis. Section II takes up the prehistory of privilege
before Wigmore, tracing its evolution and rationale from the
jurisprudence of Rome through early English common law and its
development in Great Britain, and surveying the breadth of the
nineteenth century treatises immediately preceding Wigmore and their
treatment of confidentiality. Section III turns to the architect of American
privilege law himself, providing a brief biography relevant to his work
and a sketch of how Wigmore’s magnum opus came to be, before
descending into the details of how Wigmore conjured a requirement of
confidentiality ex nihilo. In Section IV, the Article briefly recapitulates
some of the criticisms and difficulties that Wigmore’s parthenogenesis
has occasioned, albeit erring on the side of concision given so many able
authors have gone before.23 The conclusion returns to the genius of
Wigmore and argues that, however murky the basis of his invention and
thorny the difficulties it has occasioned, Wigmore’s triumphs
immeasurably outweigh what was a minor if meddlesome misstep in the
development of the law. The man is fundamentally blameless in the
matter, having acted on his conscience and reason, adjudged under the
circumstances of his times. But modernity ought to shed any unreasoned
obsequiousness to such an eminence and inter at last a misstep that has
only become apparent since those long-ago times.

NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2019)).
20. WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 111 (1985)
(cited in Edward J. Imwinkelried, Introduction to the Treatise: The New Wigmore in
Perspective, in THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2019)).
21. Correll, supra note 15, at 1037-38; see RICE, ACPITUS, supra note 15 (“By 1950
Wigmore’s rule on confidentiality appears to have taken hold.”).
22. See Radin, supra note 1, at 488; ABEL HENDY JONES GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL
PROCEDURE OF CICERO’S TIME 484 (Clarendon Press 1901) (describing the evidentiary
protections afforded Roman patroni or “patrons”—as counsel were called—in respect
of their clients); cf. EDWARD P. WEEKS & CHARLES THEODORE BOONE, A TREATISE ON
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW §§ 4-5, at 5-7 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co.
2d ed. 1892) (1878) [hereinafter WEEKS] (summarizing the role of the patroni
causarum and other classes of advocate in Roman law).
23. See, e.g., Correll, supra note 15, at 1031-32; Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra
note 2, at 967, 968 nn.2-5; Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 16, at 861-63; Geoffrey C.
Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1061, 1071-72 (1978); James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege (Part I), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1963); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privilege in Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956);
Radin supra note 1, at 487.
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A SECONDARY PREHISTORY OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

Predictably, likely the most cited source on the history of attorneyclient privilege prior to Wigmore is Wigmore himself,24 whose rendition
might be expected to favor his discovery of uncompromising
confidentiality as a requirement for privilege. Commendably, it does not:
Wigmore appears content to have baldly invented the precept from thin
air, or at least disinclined to make his invention seem less bald.25 A
searching prehistory of the attorney-client privilege, with emphasis on its
basis and the role of confidentiality—supported in many places by
Wigmore’s scholarship and that of the eminent legal historians Edward
Weeks26 and David Drysdale,27 amongst others28—is necessary
foundation for understanding the breadth of Wigmore’s parthenogenesis.
This prehistory differs perhaps from others in focusing upon secondary
rather than primary sources, for the salient question here is how scholars
viewed the state of the law rather than recitation of the opinions
themselves of the early courts that so often required exegeses to achieve
some measure of consistency.29

A. Evolution of the Rationale and Scope of Privilege
The prehistory of the law of privilege may be divided into three
distinct periods separated by time and rationale: its origins in the Roman
Republic and Empire, its assimilation in the common law of England as a
license afforded to the attorney, and its evolution in Great Britain into a
protection under the prerogative of the client.

24. See, e.g., John William Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 BUS. LAW.
461, 473 n.57 (1982).
25. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2311, at 3233-35.
26. See WEEKS, supra note 22, §§ 142-143, at 295-304.
27. See David Drysdale, Chapter 1: History of the Attorney-Client Privilege, in PAUL
R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1 (Thomson Reuters
ed. 2019) [hereinafter Drysdale’s History]; David Drysdale, Requirement of
Confidentiality and Its Premise, in PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES § 6:3 (Thomson Reuters ed. 2019) [hereinafter Drysdale on
Confidentiality].
28. See Radin, supra note 1; Hazard, supra note 23.
29. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 4 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898) (“From the diversity and multitude of the
casual rulings by the judges,—rulings often hastily made, ill-considered, and wrong,—
from the endeavor to follow these as precedents and to generalize and theorize upon
them, from the forgetting by some courts, in making this attempt, of the accidental and
empirical nature of much in these determinations, and the remembering of this fact by
others, there has resulted plenty of confusion.”). Should an exhaustive and punctilious
survey of the inconsistencies of the cases themselves be desired, Drysdale’s is without
compare. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27.
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Privilege’s Origins in the Roman Republic and Empire

Legal advocates as such are not attested before the rise of Rome,
though the precursors to the profession were known in Hellenic Athens.30
Rome had its lawyers, but law under the Republic was hostile to
restrictions upon evidence such as that an attorney-client privilege would
impose.31 Inadmissibility was particularly disfavored in civil procedure,
for “such rules, although they may be necessary to protect an ignorant
jury . . . , were hardly required for a Roman judex or recuperatores. It was
better that they should hear all, even the reported statement of an
unsworn man, and draw their own conclusions.”32 Criminal trials before
juries, however, erected some few bulwarks, albeit of a less rigid nature
than procedures under the Empire.33 For some grave public offenses such
as extortion,34 defense counsel was made incompetent to render
testimony, as illustrated in the Ciceronian oration In Verrem.35 This seems

30. See WEEKS, supra note 22, § 2, at 2 (“Among the Athenians it does not appear
that there was any distinct class of men whose peculiar office it was to speak on behalf
of parties in courts of justice.”); see also James K. Gaynor, Law Through the Ages, 14 S.
TEX. L.R. 147, 153-54 (1972) (noting an informal set of advisors).
31. See JOHN THOMAS ABDY, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMONG THE
ROMANS 109 (Cambridge, Macmillan & Co. 1857) (“[T]he intention of the Roman
lawyers was to facilitate to the utmost the admission of evidence, rather than to
attempt in any way, by too narrowly sifting it, to favour its exclusion.”); see also
GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 273-74 (speaking of Ciceronian practice).
32. GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 274.
33. Compare id. at 482 (“The regulations as to who might or should give evidence
cannot be perfectly illustrated for the Ciceronian period, and it would be rash to
attribute to this epoch all the rules of the later Roman law.”), with ABDY, supra note 31,
at 125-27 (discussing later practice and noting some differences). But compare
Gaynor, supra note 30, at 160 (finding there were “virtually no rules of evidence” in
criminal trials too); with 1 SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, ESEK COWEN, & NICHOLAS HILL JR., A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 148 (New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 2d American ed.
1843) (1814) [hereinafter PHILLIPPS AM. 2D] (“The Roman law will appear, in the
foregoing regulations, to have been too narrow and restrictive on the question of
incompetency.”).
34. Although titled “extortion” by long usage, the Roman court quaestio de
repetundis overseeing “extortion” had within its bailiwick cases of executive
corruption and embezzlement, the notion being that any so transgressing used the
power of his office to compel—that is, to extort—the emoluments he obtained. Such
prosecutions increased after the lex Acilia repetundarum of 122 BC, which (besides
excluding counsel as a witness, see infra note 35) subjected senators to charges of
extortion tried before a jury including the lesser knightly class of the equites, in large
part to combat corruption by senators serving as provincial governors. See ALLAN
CHESTER JOHNSON, PAUL COLEMAN-NORTON & FRANK CARD BOURNE, ANCIENT ROMAN
STATUTES 38-46 (U. Tex. 1961) (introducing and translating the lex Acilia),
www.droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/acilia_johnson.html
[perma.cc/NBN7-NCKP]; GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 418-22.
35. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, In Verrem, in 1 ORATIONES WITH A COMMENTARY 186
(George Long annot., London, Whitaker & Co. 2d ed. 1862) (“Quid Lucullus, qui tum in
Macedonia fuit, melius haec cognovit quam tu, Hortensi [Verres’s counsel], qui Romae
fuisti? . . . nonne te mihi testem in hoc crimine eripuit non istius innocentia sed legis
exceptio?”); Radin, supra note 1, at 488 (discussing In Verrem and citing GREENIDGE,
supra note 22, at 484). Long’s notes to Cicero add helpfully that “[t]he Lex under which
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an especial application of the Roman legal maxim “nullus idoneus testis
in re sua intelligitur,”36 viz. that none is deemed a proper witness in his
own cause.37 Stated elsewhere more generally, the parties’ respective
counsel were privileged from being compelled to bear witness.38 Indeed,
some evidence suggests this bar to involuntary testimony reached
beyond the case at hand should a client be tried in a different court on
another charge.39 Even before the birth of Christ, therefore, the rudiments
of privilege had emerged — rooted not at all in objective confidentiality
but in the position counsel occupied.40 As went the reasoning: “to compel
a citizen to divulge a secret and thereby breach a moral duty is wrong.”41
The great scholar of Roman jurisprudence Max Radin42 advances a
further theorem: that counsel’s incompetence to testify arose by analogy
to a slave’s in cases involving his master.43 So intrinsic was the slave’s
disability at Roman law that even in non-criminal cases the testimony of
slaves was verboten.44 By some lights, the entire household of the accused

Verres was being prosecuted [for extortion] excluded a ‘patronus’ from being a
witness.” CICERO, supra; see JOHNSON, COLEMAN-NORTON & BOURNE, supra note 34, ¶ 16.
36. This maxim, although no longer applicable today, has survived in legal Latin to
the modern era. Nullus idoneus testis in re sua intelligitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2015); Nullus idoneus testis in re sua intelligitur, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 1969). It may even be found in the earliest America cases, albeit in admiralty. E.g.,
Clarke v. The Dodge Healy, 5 F. Cas. 949, 951 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1827) (Washington, J.)
(describing as a maxim of civil law, equity, admiralty, and common law alike); Spurr v.
Pearson, 22 F. Cas. 1011, 1012 (C.C. D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J.) (describing it as a maxim
of the civil law and consistent with the common law).
37. See ABDY, supra note 31, at 126 (citing the maxim to explain why testimony was
precluded from “every person who had any direct interest in the cause, whether
parties to the suit, or not”); PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 147 (citing as principle
of Roman evidentiary law); see also JOHNSON, COLEMAN-NORTON & BOURNE, supra note
34, ¶ 16 (excluding also freed slaves of the accused).
38. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and
Professional Secret, 39 SW. L.J. 661, 667 (1985); GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 484 (“The
relationship of client and patron, in the loose form in which it prevailed in Cicero’s
time, was also a bar to compulsory testimony.”); see Radin, supra note 1, at 488
(“Advocates equally from very ancient times could not be called as witnesses against
their clients while the case was in progress.”).
39. See GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 484.
40. See id.; Shuman, supra note 38, at 667; Radin, supra note 1, at 487-89; see also
ABDY. supra note 31, at 126.
41. Shuman, supra note 38, at 667.
42. See William O. Douglas, Max Radin, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 163 (1948); see also A. M.
Kidd, Max Radin, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1950).
43. See Radin, supra note 1, at 487-89; see also Shuman, supra note 38, at 667 (citing
Radin).
44. See Shuman, supra note 38, at 667; Radin, supra note 11, at 487-88; JAMES LEIGH
STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, PROBLEMS OF THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW 126-28 (Clarendon Press
1912) (criminal procedure) [hereinafter STRACHAN-DAVIDSON]; GREENIDGE, supra note
22, at 391 n.1, 394 n.1 (noting general bar to compelled testimony from the accused’s
slaves); id. at 273 (“The sole qualification for a witness in civil procedure was that he
should be a free man.”). There seem peculiar exceptions to this supposedly inviolable
rule, including that for cases of incestum, but the authorities agree these exceptions
prove, rather than refute, the rule. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 38, at 667 n.23.
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was privileged from testimony, or at least certain relations.45 Radin
reasons that, just as slaves or other members of the household, the
testimony of counsel would be “valueless either for or against a litigant”
as either biased by affiliation or “unworthy of belief” should he repudiate
his sworn duties to his client.46 Roman law, arguendo, accordingly came
to recognize the corollary that “the advocate had both the privilege of
refusing testimony and the duty to refuse it.”47 There remain difficulties
with Radin’s neat ætiology, of which but one is that slaves’ testimony was
permitted in favor of their master should they persevere despite the
tortures to which they were put.48 Nor is the premise unassailable, for
Weeks too espies an analogy, but now it is the patron who fills the role of
master and the client that of slave.49 This theorem of origin, albeit
thought-provoking, has not been verified in antiquity; what remains is the
observed practice that counsel were privileged from testimony.50
Radin adds more concretely that under the Empire, “advocates and
attorneys (agents) were made completely incompetent as witnesses in
the case in which they acted” by imperial decree.51 He refers to the
towering Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian I in its precept that “ne patroni in
causa, cui patrocinium praestiterunt, testimonium decant,” viz. that no
attorneys should give testimony in a cause where they acted as counsel.52
By this time, moreover, the implicit rationale for this longstanding rule
had become explicit: “[t]he Roman Law rejected the evidence of . . . the
advocate, in nearly the same cases in which the common law holds them
incompetent; but not for the same reason . . . [but] because of the identity

45. See Radin, supra note 11, at 488; GREENIDGE, supra note 22, at 483; ABDY. supra
note 31, at 127.
46. Radin, supra note 1, at 488-89.
47. Id. at 489; see Shuman, supra note 38, at 667.
48. See STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 44, at 126-27. The reference to torture is
not metaphorical; before a slave might bear witness, he had to undergo corporal
torture to test the truth of his words. Id.; e.g., id. at 113.
49. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 333, at 663-64 (discussing patroni and clients at Roman
law and concluding that “[t]he relation which existed between them was similar to that
of parent and child, or rather that of master and slave”).
50. See sources cited supra note 38.
51. Radin, supra note 1, at 488; see also id. at 489 (citing supra note 47).
52. See, e.g., Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614
(Ch.) (quoted in 1 SIMON GREENLEAF & ISAAC A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 240, at 271-72 n.7 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1866) (1842)
[hereinafter GREENLEAF 12TH]) (“The civil law, in deed, considered the advocate and
client so identified or bound together, that the advocate was, I believe, generally not
allowed to be a witness for the client. ‘Ne patroni in causa, cui patrocinium præstiterunt,
testimonium dicant,’ says the Digest.”); accord Potter v. Inhabitants of Ware, 55 Mass.
519, 520 (1848) (“It was a rule of the Roman law, that judges should take care that
advocates be not allowed as witnesses: Mandatis cavetur, ut præsides attendant, ne
patroni in causa, cui patrocinium præstiterunt, testimonium dicant. Dig. 22, 5, 25. The
reason, as Professor Greenleaf remarks, was, that the Roman law seemed to consider
advocates ‘as not credible, because of the identity of their interest, opinions, and
prejudices with those of their clients.’”). These cite the twenty-second tractate of the
Digest
of
Justinian,
which
may
be
found
readily
today
at
www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian/digest22.shtml [perma.cc/BH5U-GLMM].
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of their interest, opinions, and prejudices, with those of their clients.”53
This of course is only a restatement of the particular application of nullus
idoneus noted above: if there is identity of client and counsel, the latter
can no more be credited in his own cause than the former.54
Yet in the later Empire, and surely as of the Corpus of AD 529-534,
juries had fallen into desuetude and magistrates had become both
inquisitors and decisors of their cases.55 Indeed, the whole Roman system
of law disappeared from western Europe in the fall of the Western Empire
in AD 476 at the swords of the Germanic tribes.56 Only with the
rediscovery of the long-lost Corpus in twelfth century Amalfi was the
study of Roman law revived, leading ultimately to the Napoleonic Code of
1804, a “Roman law adapted to the life and times of the French people,”
which code in turn formed the foundation of most civil law jurisdictions.57
In England alone, where a “strong, native common law” had already
sprung, did substantive Roman law did not prevail.58 Ironically, however,
it was English common law trials that more resembled those of Cicero’s
day in employing an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system,
whereunder the court acts as a neutral arbiter of accuser and accused,
rather than an examiner charged with exacting the truth on its own.59
Likely the earliest English jury trials were closer yet to Cicero’s, with the
jurors “usually personally familiar with the facts of the case” and active
participants.60 But much separated Roman from English practice as the
latter evolved: whereas a English judge came to regulate the trial and
testimony of witnesses, the Ciceronian judge had largely deferred to the
opposing parties.61 “Under such circumstances,” observes James
Strachan-Davidson, another noted scholar of Roman jurisprudence, “no
‘Law of Evidence’ could practically grow up.”62

42.

53. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 238, at 268 n.2; see sources cited infra note

54. See supra notes 35-39.
55. See STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 44, at 158-65 (describing in detail the
evolution from jury trial under the Republic to a fully inquisitorial system under the
Empire); id. at 125-26 (quoted infra note 62); see also Gaynor, supra note 30, at 160.
56. See Gaynor, supra note 30, at 158; Joseph W. Planck, The Survival of Roman Law,
51 A.B.A. J. 259, 259-60 (1965).
57. Planck, supra note 56, at 260-61; see Gaynor, supra note 30, at 182-83; see also
Shuman, supra note 38, at 679-80. The term “civil law” refers to its derivation from the
Corpus Juris Civilis, and only inconveniently happens to be the same name as the branch
of the common law contrasted with the criminal code. To be sure, there are analogues
to attorney-client privilege in civil law jurisdictions, see, e.g., id. at 678-85; Radin, supra
note 1, at 496-97, but as the Anglo-American tradition that Wigmore interpreted is that
of the common law — as specified in the very title of his book — this Article does not
examine them further.
58. Planck, supra note 56, at 259.
59. See STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 44, at 112 & n.3.
60. Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:2 & nn.10-11.
61. See STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 44, at 121-125 (discussing discrepancies
between British and Roman approach to the evidence of witnesses).
62. Id. at 125. Strachan-Davidson adds that “in the system which under the
Principate superseded the publica judicia, the judge had a freer hand . . . But it was then
too late for any Law of Evidence; for the accusatorial system was giving way to the
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Privilege in England as the Attorney’s Point of Honor

It was, therefore, under English common law that attorney-client
privilege first reached full blossom.63 Whether the Roman rule was
directly assimilated or provided support indirectly must remain
uncertain, though likely there is some of both.64 Multiple sources place the
privilege’s recurrence in the long reign of Elizabeth I in the sixteenth
century,65 “where it already appears unquestioned,” according to
Wigmore66 — though the later legal historian Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
questions how unquestioned it truly was.67 Although hardly proving the
point, Wigmore adds that the privilege could scarcely date earlier, for only
in the Elizabethan era did compulsory process to secure testimony
evolve.68 Agreeing fully with neither, Drysdale details that privilege
followed from such compulsion, for as the jury became a disinterested
panel, and the parties in interest were thought incredible (recall the
maxim of nullus idoneus69), the availability of testimony from counsel
would have been prejudicially dispositive.70 Blackstone, meanwhile,
praises the ancient English provenance of the attorney-client trust whilst

inquisitorial, and this latter brooks no restraints on the arbitrary discretion of the
judge as to his methods for arriving at the truth.” Id. at 125-26.
63. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3193-94.
64. Compare Shuman, supra note 38, at 670 (“Did the common law’s recognition of
an attorney-client privilege spring forth independent of Roman law and its earlier
recognition of an attorney-client privilege? One can answer this question, if at all, only
through educated guesswork.”); and Radin, supra note 1, at 489 (“That the Roman
precedent was the origin of the English rule as far as attorneys are concerned, cannot
be proved.”), with Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614
(Ch.) (discussing Roman law as analogue to British privilege).
65. E.g., Shuman, supra note 38, at 670; Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:2 &
n.20; Hazard, supra note 23, at 1070 (averring that “Elizabethan cases do indeed refer
to the privilege” although dating reported cases to the latter half of the seventeenth
century); A. Kenneth Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, PRAC. L., Nov.
1969, at 15, 16; WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290 at 3193-34 & n.1.
66. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3193.
67. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1070 (“But beyond this, the historical foundations of
the privilege are not as firm as the tenor of Wigmore’s language suggests. On the
contrary, recognition of the privilege was slow and halting until after 1800.”). As shall
be seen, Hazard disputes quite a good lot on the history of the attorney-client privilege
and features regularly as a straw man to be refuted in Drysdale’s History. See Drysdale’s
History, supra note 27, § 1:2 n.19, 1:4 nn.1-2 & 7, § 1:6 n.3 & 5, § 1:12 n.1. Drysdale has
his own foibles, however, placing enormous (not to say undeserved) faith in a singular
history of English law by Sir William Holdsworth. See generally 9 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926); e.g., Drysdale’s History, supra note 27,
§ 1:4 n.1 (preferring Sir William’s account over Hazard’s). That the truth may prevail,
this Article allows them both their say.
68. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194; accord Drysdale’s History, supra note
27, § 1:2 & nn.16-17; see also Shuman, supra note 38, at 669.
69. See supra notes 36-37; see also Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:2 & n.18
(“But, by this time, the parties were considered unfit to testify.”).
70. Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:2 & nn.17-19.
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primly critiquing the nominal disallowance of counsel in cases of felony
and treason until William III.71 This exclusion was surely more honored
in the breach than the observance,72 however, as judges agreed with
Blackstone that English jurisprudence supposed the right to counsel and
so “seldom scruple[d] to allow a prisoner counsel to stand by him at the
bar, and instruct him what questions to ask, or even to ask questions for
him, with respect to matters of fact.”73
From its earliest days, the law rendered such counsel incompetent
to testify in the suit at bar: “[i]n England, where an attorney acts as
advocate in a legal proceeding, he has been precluded altogether from
giving any evidence.”74 Such a formulation still echoes the Roman rules
and Latin maxims cited ante.75 But Wigmore and Radin instead locate the
English rule’s rationale in the pundonor76 of the barrister,77 viz. that as
such lawyers “were gentlemen almost virtute officii,” their honor would
be unacceptably compromised in being haled into testimony.78 Hazard
relatedly suggests that barristers, as members of the court, could no more
be put to the question than their brethren on the bench.79 Although these
71. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Clarendon
Press 1770) (“A rule, which . . . seems to be not at all of a piece with the rest of the
humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. For upon what face of reason can
that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is allowed him in
prosecutions for every petty trespass? Nor indeed is it strictly speaking a part of our
antient law: for the Mirror, having observed the necessity of counsel in civil suits, ‘who
know how to forward and defend the cause, by the rules of law and customs of the
realm,’ immediately afterwards subjoins; ‘and more necessary are they for defence
[sic] upon indictments and appeals of felony, than upon other venial causes.’”); see
WEEKS, supra note 22, § 14, at 19-22 (discussing Blackstone and the availability of
counsel).
72. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, sc.
4. Although pointing the reader in the proper direction, this author refuses to mark as
quotation those bon mots of the Bard that have become common parlance.
73. BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 349-50.
74. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 300 (citing Stone v. Byron, 16 Law. J. Q. B. 32, 4
Dowl. 62; L. 393; Dunn v. Packwood, 1 B. C. R. 312, 11 Jur. 242; Pearce v. Pearce, 16 L.
J. Ch. 157); see also id. § 142, at 295-96, & n.2 (“Professional communications made by
a client to his counsel are to be excluded from the jury upon grounds of public policy,
because greater mischiefs would probably result from requiring or permitting their
admission than from wholly rejecting them.”).
75. See supra notes 36-37, 51-53.
76. This word, as the italic case may suggest, is a now obsolescent abbreviation by
way of Spain of the phrase “point of honor,” for the brevity of which this author is
mindful. Radin employs it without reproach, and so, it is to be hoped, does this Article.
77. As to the distinctions amongst barristers, solicitors, counsel, attorneys, and
other genres of lawyers that ultimately prove irrelevant to this Article, see Drysdale’s
History, supra note 27, § 1:4 (“Barristers, attorneys, and solicitors”); WEEKS, supra note
22, §§ 14-21, at 19-34.
78. Radin, supra note 1, at 487; accord WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194;
see id. § 2286, at 3187-88 (discussing the privilege of a gentleman’s point of honor
more generally); see also Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.1 (acknowledging
the pundonor basis).
79. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1071. Although Hazard’s point is well-taken, that a
judge might be called to testify was not quite so unthinkable at early law as is implied.
See 2 JOHN PITT TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
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bases elide less rarefied counsel,80 Radin explains “there was at least an
equally old and powerful feeling that required a similar reticence on the
part of attorney or solicitor,” for they too held positions of the most
punctilious trust and could not honorably be expected to violate that
loyalty.81 Drysdale, too, finds the honor of any lawyer protected.82 “The
reality,” he says, “is that the privilege was given no more effect when it
was invoked by ‘counsel’ than when it was invoked by attorneys or
solicitors,”83 and there is “no apparent support” in the case law for any
disparity.84 Only because barristers were so connected to the litigation
context to which privilege was then restricted might the privilege have
seemed theirs alone; in fact, any lawyer advising on a case enjoyed the
same point of honor to demur from testimony in it.85
As in Rome, therefore, English lawyers (of any species) had the
privilege to refuse testimony — and the onus to do so.86 This privilege was
wholly that of the lawyer, obliged as he was by honor and duty both.87 It

AND IRELAND § 1244, at 1054-55 (London, W. Maxwell 2d ed. 1855) (1848) [hereinafter
TAYLOR 2D]. Drysdale, as usual, does not think Hazard’s point is well-taken, for he

observes that barristers were not officers of the court as were attorneys. Drysdale’s
History, supra note 27, § 1:4 n.1.
80. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:4 & n.2 (“If this were true, one would
think that barristers’ communications with their clients would usually have been
privileged, whereas other legal advisers (such as solicitors, attorneys, and scriveners)
would have had less recourse to this privilege. There is, however, no apparent support
for that surmise in the case law.”).
81. Radin, supra note 1, at 487 (“A servant must keep his master’s secrets, and
however honored and influential a servant, an attorney was for a long time definitely
in that class and kept something of that standing.”).
82. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.1 (“The privilege was seen as
protecting the honor of the legal advisor, who owed a duty of secrecy to his client and,
consequently, ought not be compelled to reveal the client’s secrets.”).
83. Id. & n.3. Drysdale adds, committed as he is to the irreparably inconsistent case
law, that there is no basis to surmise a difference between classes of attorneys in the
opinions. Id. & n.2. He wisely observes, however, that differences likely arise in the
cases because of the different functions lawyers perform, id. & nn.4-7, duplicating in
very similar words Hazard’s view. See Hazard, supra note 23, at 1071.
84. Id. & n.2, nn.4-6.
85. Id. (“Therefore, while it may have appeared that the privilege originated with
barristers, a closer examination of the case law (especially that of the sixteenth
century) reveals that the privilege applied to all lawyers — barristers, attorneys, and
solicitors.”).
86. Compare Radin, supra note 1, at 493 (describing of English counsel that “[i]t is
both a privilege proper, i.e., in refusing disclosure, the lawyer is violating no one’s right;
— but it is also a duty, that is, he owes to his client the duty to refuse”), with id. at 489
(describing the parallel privilege and duty in Rome, quoted supra note 47).
87. See Pye, supra note 65, at 16 (“Originally, the privilege seemed to be based upon
the honor of the attorney and belonged to the attorney, who could waive it.”); Hazard,
supra note 23, at 1070 (noting that “some of the early cases express the idea that the
privilege was that of the lawyer” because “a gentlemen does not give away matters
confided to him”); Radin, supra note 1, at 493; WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194
(“Clearly the attorney and the barrister are under a solemn pledge of secrecy, not less
binding because it is implied and seldom expressed. ‘The first duty of an attorney,’ it
has been said, ‘is to keep the secrets of his clients.’” (quoting Taylor v. Blacklow, (1836)
3 Bingh. N.C. 249 (KB) (Gaselee, J.))).
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protected not the secrecy of the communications as such, but the
principle that a counsellor ought not be made to bear witness against his
client, creating a dilemma with no honorable answer.88 Vested so in the
attorney, one unmoved by duty or honor (perish the thought) might
decline the privilege at his own whim.89 It would be overmuch to say the
client had nothing to do with it — a client would presumably not long
maintain such counsel — but he did not have much.90 This privilege
stemmed not from the security of the client’s confidentiality, but of the
security due the esteemed legal profession and its practitioners.91 Or, to
paraphrase a periphrasis of Roman law, it was not seen meet to require
an honorable citizen to betray a duly laid trust.92
Wigmore relates that recognition of testimonial privilege rooted in
the pundonor flourished in the 1600s, and “[b]y the middle of the 1700s
it seemed as though this notion would prevail.”93 Hazard, however,
disputes this efflorescence as far as the attorney-client privilege, finding
courts equivocal if not downright skeptical.94 The earliest cases do evince
some heterogeneity of result,95 though they also reveal not only advocates
but ordinary attorneys availing of the privilege.96 Drysdale’s review, albeit
noting some variances and omissions, demonstrates the latter too:
lawyers of every stripe could assert their own honorable privilege.97 But
Hazard’s suggestion that the attorney-client privilege itself was “nearly
wiped out” by the celebrated Annesley v. Anglesea98 of 1743 can only be
88. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.1 (quoted supra note 82);
WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2286 at 3187-88 (“In the trials of the 1600s, the obligations
of honor among gentlemen (and the English bench and bar were peculiarly dominated
by that standard) were often put forward as a sufficient ground for maintaining silence.
The same point of view is also plain at that time in the treatment of the privilege for
attorney and client, which was then supposed to rest upon the honorable obligations
of the attorney, rather than upon objective considerations of policy”); see also Hazard,
supra note 23, at 1070 (“It is also true that in order to prevent disclosure, the law must
prohibit it, for otherwise the lawyer would be governed by the general rule that a
witness must give evidence of facts within his knowledge.”).
89. See Pye, supra note 65, at 16; Radin, supra note 1, at 493; WIGMORE, supra note
12, § 2290, at 3196; see also Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.7 (“When held
to be the legal advisor’s privilege, it could be waived by him, although the oath of
secrecy still remained.”). The term “decline” rather than “waive” is used deliberately
in the main text, to avoid importation of the ramified superstructure of waiver that
would arise under Wigmore.
90. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3195 (“In the first place, under the
original theory, the privilege did not at all exempt the client himself. The pledge of
secrecy had not been taken by him, and therefore the ‘point of honor’ was not his to
make.”).
91. See supra note 82; see also sources cited supra notes 86-90.
92. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
93. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2286, at 3187-89.
94. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1071-80.
95. See id. at 1070-73.
96. See id. at 1071 nn.40-41.
97. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:4.
98. Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (KB). As the case is
detailed in Wigmore, Hazard, and elsewhere, its circumstances need not be elaborated,
though they make for lurid reading. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 23, at 1073-80;
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arrant hyperbole, as his own discussion shows.99
On the other hand, the pundonor doctrine was wiped out in the
inauspicious year (for Britons)100 of 1776 in the Duchess of Kingston’s
Case.101 There the House of Lords confronted a pundonor interposed by
the Viscount Barrington as to exchanges with the Duchess of Kingston,
who stood accused of bigamy.102 After deliberation, the Lords overruled
Barrington, following the views of Lord Camden and the Duke of
Richmond, and directed the viscount to answer.103 The following year it
was held at King’s Bench that “the wisdom of the law knows nothing of
that point of honor,” a meteoric fall for a once-dominant theory.104
“Doubtless the attorney’s exemption would have fallen at the same time
with the others of like origin,” writes Wigmore, “had not a new theory,
ample to sustain and even to enlarge it, by that time come to be
recognized.”105
3.

Privilege in Great Britain as the Client’s Protection106

This new theory had arisen by the early eighteenth century and
viewed privilege not as based in the attorney’s pundonor but from the

WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291 at 3197; 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, HORACE SMITH &
ALBERT PERCIVAL PERCEVAL KEEP, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE MISDEMEANORS
587-88 n.(g) (London, Stevens & Son 6th ed. 1896) (1819) [hereinafter RUSSELL 6TH].
99. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1073; see id. at 1073-80; see also infra notes 119-122
(discussing Annesley further).
100. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
101. Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.3 (discussing Duchess of Kingston’s
Case, (1776) 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (HL)); WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2286, at 3188-89
(discussing and quoting Kingston); see also id. § 2290, at 3194 (describing concomitant
end in attorney-client context).
102. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2286, at 3188-89 (discussing Kingston).
103. Id. (discussing Kingston). Camden, erstwhile Lord Chancellor from 1766 to
1770 and later Earl Camden, had pronounced before the House that “the laws of this
land — I speak it boldly in this grave assembly — are to receive another answer from
those who are called to depose at your bar, than to be told that in point of honor and
of conscience they do not think that they acquit themselves like persons of that
description when they declare what they know.” Id. (quoting Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr.
586).
104. Id. at 3189 (quoting Hill’s Trial, (1777) 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (KB)); see also
TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 1245, at 1072 (noting a peer must take the oath as witness
on pain of contempt and cannot rely upon a protestation of honor).
105. Id. § 2290, at 3194.
106. As this new theory had arisen roughly around the time that England was
transmuted into Great Britain by its union with Scotland in 1707, it is convenient to
relabel the nation in which the privilege continued to evolve. See TREATY OF UNION OF
THE TWO KINGDOMS OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND, art. 1 (July 22, 1706) (“That the Two
Kingdoms of Scotland and England, shall upon the 1st May next ensuing the date
hereof, and forever after, be United into One Kingdom by the Name of GREAT
BRITAIN.”), www.scotshistoryonline.co.uk/union.html [perma.cc/DFW5-N7T7];
Union with England Act 1707 c.7, www.legislation.gov.uk/aosp/1707/7/contents
[perma.cc/239V-7B86]; Union with Scotland Act 1706, c.11 www.legislation.gov.uk/
aep/Ann/6/11/contents [perma.cc/F6EJ-JHCF].
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client’s interest in safely securing legal advice.107 Wigmore explains that
it “looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the client’s
freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser and proposed to
assure this by removing the risk of disclosure by the attorney even at the
hands of the law.”108 Hazard essays a number of seventeenth and
eighteenth century cases seemingly advancing the newfangled theory, a
good lot of which were unsuccessful.109 Of particular moment are Spark v.
Middleton110 in 1664 and Radcliffe v. Fursman in 1730.111 In Spark, the
court allowed counsel’s objection to being sworn to answer questions
generally regarding his client, for “he should only reveal such things as he
either knew before he was Counsel, or that came to his knowledge since
by other persons.”112 But in Radcliffe, the House of Lords overruled a
similar objection that attorney-client communications are “intended for
private instruction and information only, in order to direct parties in the
conduct of their affairs. . . . no counsellor or attorney can be obliged, or
ought to discover any matter which his client reveals to him.”113 Drysdale,
to be sure, essays further than does Hazard,114 but agrees Radcliffe
signaled a particularly pivotal moment that would limit privilege law “for
the next 140 years.”115 On its authority, written correspondence from the
client (as opposed to counsel’s advice) was often held discoverable,116
unless specifically connected to an ongoing suit,117 although as will be
discussed later, that exception grew in time to swallow the harsher
rule.118
And, of course, in Annesley v. Anglesea in 1743, the Earl of Anglesea’s
attorney of twenty years was made to testify despite a lucid invocation of
the new theory of privilege:119
As to the client, the interest which he has in the privilege, is very obvious.
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law,
without employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of

107. See Pye, supra note 65, at 16; WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194-95.
108. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194.
109. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1071-73.
110. Spark v. Middleton, (1664) 1 Keb. 505, 83 Eng. Rep. 1079 (KB).
111. Radcliffe v. Fursman, (1730) 2 Bro. P.C. 514, 1 Eng. Rep. 1101 (HL).
112. Spark, 1 Keb. at 505, 83 Eng. Rep. at 1079 (quoted and discussed in Hazard,
supra note 23, at 1072).
113. Radcliffe, 2 Bro. P.C. at 516, 517 (quoted and discussed in Hazard, supra note
23, at 1073).
114. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, §§ 1:6-1:8.
115. Id. § 1:6 & n.5.
116. Id. § 1:7.
117. Id. § 1:8 & n.1 (“But not all written communications from a client to his legal
advisor were discoverable during this period. Confidential communications between a
client and his legal advisor that took place in the progress of a suit were considered
privileged communications.”).
118. Id. & nn.2-3 (“This exception to the obligation under a bill of discovery to
disclose everything known or believed in relation to the matter in question was
gradually expanded during the first decades of the nineteenth century.”); see infra
notes 139-150.
119. Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (KB).
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doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and
candidly disclose everything that is in his mind, which he apprehends may
be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be
impossible for the attorney properly to serve him: therefore to permit an
attorney, whenever he thinks fit, to betray that confidence . . . would be of
the most dangerous consequence, not only to the particular client
concerned, but to every other man who is or may be a client.120

All the same, the Lord Chief Baron Bowes thought the secrets in
question did not pertain to legal concerns, which outstripped the
ordinary rule that attorney-client communications be protected.121 (As
vivid example, Lord Anglesea had allegedly remarked to his counsel he
would gladly give ten thousand pounds to see his rival hanged, a markedly
extralegal undertaking.122)
This was not for lack of trying: Lord Anglesea sought to justify the
privilege in both theories, arguing that “the privilege is not merely that of
the attorney to maintain his honor by keeping a client’s secrets, but is a
privilege of the client against disclosure of those secrets.”123 But the result
was not so unpredictable, for Wigmore explains that “by reason of the
inconsistency of the two theories, in some of their practical applications,
the older notion, so far as represented in precedents, struggled along for
some time by the side of the newer one, like two powerful streams
debouching into the same channel,” and as a result, “a turbid and confused
volume of rulings abounded” until well into the 1800s.124 Likewise,
Drysdale writes that “[i]t took some time before the privilege was fully
viewed as the client’s and not (at least not solely) the legal advisor’s.”125
And Hazard charts roughly the same rough course via a litany of varying
results through 1830 that are decidedly niggardly with privilege by
modern standards.126 To these voices may be added Weeks127 and some
hitherto unmentioned authorities to be encountered in good time,128 who
agree there was much turbidity in the waters for a time.129
The doctrinal turbidity eventually abated: Weeks, Wigmore, Hazard,
and Drysdale all alight upon a singular case of 1833 as enunciating the

120. Id. at 1237 (quoted and discussed in Hazard, supra note 23, at 1073-80).
121. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:9 & n.10; Hazard, supra note 23, at
1078-79 & n.71.
122. Annesley, 17 How St. Trials at 1224-28 (discussed at Hazard, supra note 23, at
1074 and TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 857, at 753).
123. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1077; see also Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:9
& nn.8-9.
124. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3195; see also Pye, supra note 65, at 16.
125. Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:3 & n.6.
126. See Hazard, supra note 23, at 1080-83 (“As of 1830, the attorney-client
privilege in England stood in this relatively definite but very limited state.”).
127. See WEEKS, supra note 22, §§ 142-143, at 295-298.
128. See infra Section II-B.
129. See, e.g., GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 240 at 271 & nn.4-7.
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modern conception of the privilege.130 In Greenough v. Gaskell,131 the Lord
Chancellor Henry Brougham, lately ennobled as Baron Brougham and
Vaux, offered a throaty endorsement of a robust privilege rooted in the
client’s rather than attorney’s prerogative and indeed, the good
functioning of the entire system of public justice:132
The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has
sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the
law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular
disposition to afford them protection . . . . But it is out of regard to the
interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of
justice, which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence,
in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and
obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the
privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal
resources. Deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture
to consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half
his case.133

Lord Brougham was prolific, embodying the entire equitable
power of Britain in one person.134 He had decided another heralded case
espousing a broad privilege in the very same year, Bolton v. Liverpool,135
which went so far as to quote the law of Rome as evidencing a broad and
thorough protection.136 Drysdale accords Bolton the honor of properly
interring the Radcliffe rule, albeit not without some conflicts.137 Following
Greenough and Bolton, the justification of attorney-client privilege thus
settled into more or less its final form prior to Wigmore.138
With this sea change in the philosophical underpinnings of the
privilege, dispute as to the scope of the attorney’s privilege from
130. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:11 & nn.2-14; Hazard, supra note 23,
at 1083-85; WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3197; WEEKS, supra note 22, § 193, at
296-97.
131. Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 103, 621 (quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3197 and
Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:11 & n.13). Weeks quotes a different section of
the opinion: “If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional
employment, a solicitor receives a communication in his professional capacity, either
from a client or on his account, and for his benefit, in the transaction of his business,
or which amounts to the same thing, if he commits to paper in the course of his
employment on his behalf, matters which he knows only through his professional
relation to his client, he is not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to
withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or produce the
papers in any court of law or equity, either as a party or witness.” Id. (quoted in WEEKS,
supra note 22, § 193 at 297).
134. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2017) (discussing “a structural feature of English equity:
there was one Chancellor”).
135. Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.).
136. Id. (quoted supra note 52).
137. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:8 & nn.4-6.
138. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 23, at 1084-87; TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, §§ 83435, at 732-34 (discussing Greenough and Bolton).
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compulsory testimony about his client grew vexing.139 Greenough
declared that “[i]f the privilege were confined to communications
connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no
one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any
proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous.”140 But in its
beginnings, the notion of privilege had been straightforwardly and
narrowly limited to testimony anent a pending or at least imminent
lawsuit.141 Indeed, even in the early 1800s, there had been a strident
resurgence of this less protective view under the superintendence of the
Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench Charles Abbott, later Baron
Tenterden, creating tension between the British courts of law (i.e. the
King’s Bench) and those of chancery (the latter, being under the ultimate
superintendence of the Lord Chancellor at the time, equating roughly to
modern common law courts of equity, such as still exist in the United
States of America in Delaware).142 This strict linkage, however, had been
at least partly based in the now-outmoded view of the barrister’s
privilege, and so the question simmered as to whether it had obsolesced
along with the pundonor, and privilege might now extend to all
professional exchanges with counsel.143
Wigmore is quite certain that it did,144 and supplies a lengthy list of
authorities saying so, not least of which is Lord Brougham.145 Weeks
acknowledges the contrary eminences supporting the original, strict
rule,146 but after a dutiful measure of hand-wringing, accepts the older
authorities to be outdated and the broader rule to be correct.147 Drysdale,
with customary punctiliousness, detects some final settling throughout
the 1800s before atavisms were fully assimilated, with Lord Chancellor
Roundell Palmer, later created Earl Selborne, announcing at last in 1873
139. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194-96; WEEKS, supra note 22, §§ 142143, at 295-304.
140. Greenough, 1 Myl. & K. at 103, 39 Eng. Rep. at 621 (quoted in WEEKS, supra
note 22, § 143 at 299).
141. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 295-96 (“[I]n the earlier cases, when the origin
of the rule would be most likely to be kept in view, this doctrine would seem to have
been most strictly applied, and the witness excused from testifying, on the ground that
he was attorney in the cause.”); see WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3196.
142. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:10.
143. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3196 (“”[T]he attorney’s exemption
was by the original theory limited to communications received since the beginning of
the litigation at bar and for its purposes only.”); WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 30002.
144. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3196 (“Under the influence of the newer
theory, an extension of the attorney’s exemption of course took place, to include
communications made, first, during any other litigation, next, in contemplation of
litigation, next, during a controversy but not yet looking to litigation, and, lastly, in any
consultation for legal advice, wholly irrespective of litigation or even of controversy.”).
145. Id. § 2291, at 3197-99. It must be observed that Wigmore also quotes for two
entire pages the discourse of Jeremy Bentham arguing against such an attorney-client
privilege, but he then proceeds to address and rebut the arguments in serial fashion.
Id. § 2291, at 3199-3204.
146. WEEKS, supra note 22, §§ 142-143, at 295-296.
147. Id. at 299-305.
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that “any such limitation was really ill-founded” and had long before been
overruled in effect.148 Hazard, ever the jurisprudential gadfly, concludes
from his historical review that “‘tradition,’ both British and American,
thus clearly sustained a privilege confined to those communications that
are related directly to pending or anticipated litigation.”149 Perhaps that
is so, but the tradition of an earlier era had evolved well beyond so
narrowly delimited a protection by the time of Wigmore.150

B. Privilege in the Nineteenth Century Treatises
This discussion has thus far been much acquainted with Wigmore,
Drysdale, Hazard, and Weeks (pace others) by dint of their historical
research, but there await a greater library of treatises that state the law
of privilege prevailing in the nineteenth century, when Wigmore was
born. Likely the work of Samuel March Phillipps is the foremost, with
editions published in both America and Britain.151 In 1817, Phillipps
elaborates that “[c]onfidential communications between attorney and
client are not to be revealed at any period of time — not in an action
between third persons — nor after the proceeding, to which they
referred, is at an end — nor after the dismissal of the attorney.”152 True,
“this privilege of the client is confined to such communications as are
made with reference to professional business during the relation of
attorney and client,” but his is the broad view that Lord Brougham would
proclaim sixteen years later.153 Forty years later yet, Phillipps’s rhetoric
controlled still, and his essential textbook remained the American
tractate on the law of privilege, perhaps having proven prescient.154 As
both the British and American editions agree as to counsel, “the mouth of
such a person is shut forever.”155 Yet evidencing the early state of affairs,
the American edition of Phillipps reminisces fondly in 1843 of the
perhaps more proper days during which a gentleman’s honor prevented
his being turned against a confidante, even whilst ruing it is no longer
so.156
148. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:8 & nn.8-15 (quoting Minet v.
Morgan, (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 361 (Ch.)).
149. Hazard, supra note 23, at 1091.
150. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3196 (“But this gradual extension occupied
(in England, at least) nearly a hundred years of judicial annals; and the shackles of the
earlier precedents were not finally thrown off until the decade of 1870.”).
151. See PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33; SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, A. Strahan 3d British ed. 1817) (1814) [hereinafter
PHILLIPPS BR. 3D]; see also RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 581 & n.(a) (describing
Phillipps as “a very eminent writer on the Law of Evidence”).
152. PHILLIPPS BR. 3D, supra note 151, at 108.
153. Id.
154. See PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33.
155. PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 142; PHILLIPPS BR. 3D, supra note 151, at
108.
156. See PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 144-45 (“And if the privilege, now
claimed, extended to all cases and persons, Lord W. Russel died by the hands of an
assassin, and not by the hands of the law; for his friend Lord Howard was permitted to
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Three further treatises of the middle decades of the century provide
confirmation that the privilege was well accepted and inured to the
client’s protection rather than the attorney’s honor.157 John Pitt Taylor’s
second edition of 1855 declares that “the rule is now well settled, that,
where a barrister, solicitor, or attorney, is professionally employed by a
client, all communications which pass between them in the course and for
the purpose of that employment, are so far privileged.”158 And Taylor’s
privilege is firmly rooted in the client-oriented rationale of Lord
Brougham, whose cases of two decades earlier are cited already as
celebrated truisms.159 Edmund Powell’s third edition of 1869 introduces
his section on privilege with the heading that “[c]ounsel, solicitors, and
attorneys cannot be compelled to disclose communications which have
been made to them in professional confidence by their clients,”160 and in
short order cites Lord Brougham as to the reason why.161 Powell neatly
distinguishes away the then-recent contrary cases under the King’s Bench
of Lord Tenterdon ostensibly limiting privilege to litigation by accepting
the view that privilege begins when counsel is retained and ends when he
is dismissed (though his lips remain sealed thereafter), and so if that
retention extends before or beyond a case at bar so too does the
privilege.162
A particular introduction is due the third mentioned, by Simon
Greenleaf, whose exposition of evidence in 1842 had proven so popular
that it had reached its twelfth edition by 1866, not long after its original
author’s demise.163 Drysdale, indeed, places him above Phillipps in
eminence.164 Evincing the degree to which American law remained based
in the Anglo-American common tradition, Greenleaf attends to Lord
give evidence of confidential conversations between them. All good men, indeed,
thought that he should have gone almost all lengths rather than have betrayed that
confidence; but still, if the privilege had extended to such a case, it was the business of
the court to interfere, and prevent the evidence being given.” (citations omitted)); see
also WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2287, at 3189 (noting that the pundonor’s “expiry was
undoubtedly viewed with reluctance by many, and traces of its later survival across
the water were to be noticed for some time thereafter” (citations omitted)).
157. EDMUND POWELL, JOHN CUTLER & EDMUND FULLER GRIFFIN, THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, Butterworths 3d ed. 1869) [hereinafter
POWELL 3D]; GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52; TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79.
158. TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 832, at 730-31.
159. Id. §§ 834-35 at 732-34.
160. POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 96.
161. Id. at 97 n.(e) and accompanying text (“But for the existence of the rule, ‘no
man would dare to consult a professional adviser with a view to his defence, or the
enforcement of his rights.’”) (quoting Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K.
88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.)).
162. Id. at 100-01.
163. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52.
164. Drysdale on Confidentiality, supra note 27, at n.13. Drysdale, however, writes
without any asserted basis and a century after the fact, and so contemporary encomia
may be more illuminating. E.g., RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 581 & n.(a); 2 WILLIAM
OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE MISDEMEANORS 611 & n.(n)
(London, Jos. Butterworth & Son 2d ed. 1828) (1819) [hereinafter RUSSELL 2D]. All the
same, Greenleaf was assuredly taken as a magister of the practice.
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Brougham’s Greenough for the rationale of the privilege as his first order
of business.165 Greenleaf likewise inters the contrary decision of
Radcliffe,166 which he declares “was not satisfactory; and though it was
silently followed in one case, and reluctantly submitted to in another, yet
its principle has since been ably controverted and refuted,” citing Lord
Brougham in Bolton this time.167 So too Greenleaf diligently recites the
ancient series of attempts to limit privileged exchanges to litigation
before concluding succinctly that “all these distinctions have been
overruled, and the communications held to be within the privilege.”168
Indeed, Greenleaf provides thoughtful evidence from Bolton and beyond
that the American, British, and English rules of privilege all ultimately
look back to Roman law.169 To adopt his sage summary, “[t]he great object
of the rule seems plainly to require that the entire professional
intercourse between client and attorney, whatever it may have consisted
in, should be protected by profound secrecy.”170
The final decade of the nineteenth century brought Weeks’s second
edition of 1892, of which much has been said already.171 Of novel interest,
however, is the sixth edition of William Oldnall Russell’s work in 1896,
which may usefully be contrasted with the second in 1828.172 In the
earlier version, Russell cites Phillipps’s “eminent” view of privilege as
extending to all professional legal work, but remains obligated to cite the
contrary authorities without fully endorsing either the broader or stricter
view.173 In 1828, of course, Lord Brougham had not yet opined, nor was
he yet even chancellor.174 By contrast, Russell’s sixth edition notes that “it
is now clearly settled that the privilege of professional confidence is not
limited to cases in which a suit is in contemplation, but that the client’s
privilege extends much beyond communications in respect of a suit.”175
Russell, indeed, much mirrors his contemporary Weeks on the matter.176
The dramatic increase of detail from 1828 to 1896 is likewise instructive,
as Russell’s treatment more than doubles from barely six pages to
fourteen.177 Both editions nonetheless agree that “[t]he privilege of not
165. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, §§ 237-38, at 267-68 & nn.2-3.
166. Radcliffe v. Fursman, (1730) 2 Bro. P.C. 514, 1 Eng. Rep. 1101 (HL) (discussed
supra notes 111-113).
167. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 240, at 271 & nn.4-7.
168. Id. § 240a, at 274.
169. Id. § 238 at 268 n.2; id. § 240, at 271-72 n.7 (quoting Bolton v. Corp. of
Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.)); see supra notes 52-53.
170. Id. at 271-72. Wigmore would have something to do with Greenleaf’s great
work, as shall be detailed later. See infra text accompanying notes 239-241.
171. WEEKS, supra note 22, §§ 141-182, at 293-379.
172. Compare RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, with RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164.
173. RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 611-12.
174. Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.); Bolton v.
Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.).
175. RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 582 & n.(g) (citing Greenough).
176. See supra notes 146-146.
177. Compare RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 609-615, with RUSSELL 6TH, supra note
98, at 578-592. Citations to Russell’s Sixth in Section II-C infra accordingly
predominate.

2021]

The Parthenogenesis of Wigmore

451

being examined on such subjects is the privilege of the client, and not of
the attorney or counsel; and it never ceases,”178 corroborating at least that
even before Lord Brougham the demise of the pundonor and attorney’s
privilege was well understood. Also edifying by way of contemporaneity
is the work of Elliott & Elliott in 1904, the same year Wigmore’s treatise
appeared.179 Though brief, the Elliotts’ treatment confirms further the
prevailing rationale for and breadth of the rule.180
So speak the treatises,181 limning the destination at which attorneyclient privilege had arrived by the close of the nineteenth century. Hazard,
it must be noted, finds the courts of early America at least as resistant to
a broad privilege as those of England.182 But the great weight of
contemporary writings is to the contrary, as has been seen,183 and at least
some measure of Hazard’s supposed authority apparently reflects
conflation of the pundonor with the modern rationale.184
178. RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 610; accord RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 578
(substituting “solicitor” for “attorney”).
179. 1 BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1904).
180. Id. § 624 at 735 (rationale); id. § 625, at 736 & n.14 (lack of connection to
litigation).
181. Besides those ineluctably omitted because of space or authorial oversight, one
notable authority has yet to appear: James Bradley Thayer, who, as shall be elaborated
in due course, was Wigmore’s mentor and an authority on evidence in his own right.
See infra notes 287-297 and accompanying text. There is also Jeremy Bentham’s whose
strident broadside critique of privilege as a whole will be further elaborated below, as
it ill fits the more nuanced discussions of those presuming the validity of privilege in
the first place. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE SPECIFICALLY
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 302-25 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827) (discussed infra
notes 307-320).
182. See Hazard, supra note 23, at 1087-91. Hazard’s discussion is much
complicated because the cases he surveys are predominantly concerned with
attorneys who arguably abetted their clients’ frauds, and thus privilege might rise or
fall based on the applicability of the well-accepted crime-fraud exception to privilege.
183. See supra Section II-B. Even one of Hazard’s courts surveying the attorney’s
tawdry behavior concluded that “if the question had arisen for the first time in this
case[,] I should have no hesitation in deciding that the communications . . . were not
privileged. . . . The practice, however, appears to have been otherwise for more than a
century and a half, and I do not now feel authorized to adopt a new rule on the subject.”
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528, 598 (N.Y. Ch. 1848) (Walworth, Ch.)
(quoted in Hazard, supra note 23, at 1090). Such language speaks to a well-recognized
privilege rather than one only fitfully credited. See GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, §
239a, at 270 (“The decisions upon this point are very numerous in the American
States.”).
184. See, e.g., Potter v. Inhabitants of Ware, 55 Mass. 519 (1848). There, counsel
had raised an objection to admission of the attorney’s evidence on appeal, pointing to
the principle that “the practice of allowing the counsel in a cause to give evidence
therein, as a witness for his client, is dangerous, indecent and reprehensible. When
counsel are put upon the stand as witnesses, their conduct becomes liable to
animadversion, and the profession may thus be brought into contempt,” but
conspicuously omitting Lord Brougham’s reasoning in favor of a pair of bail court
cases. Id. at 520-22. The court was not impressed with the bail court cases, whose
authority was found lacking, and as for the attorney’s “animadversion,” concluded: “In
most cases, counsel cannot testify for their clients without subjecting themselves to
just reprehension. But there may be cases in which they can do it, not only without
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C. “Confidentiality” and Attorney-Client Relations
Before Wigmore
Giving these precedents effect, an 1856 opinion of the Alabama
Supreme Court is representative in declaring the framework for privilege,
citing Greenough and quoting Lord Brougham at length:
There is, perhaps, no principle of law which rests on a sounder basis, or
which is supported by a more uniform chain of adjudication, than that
which holds all information acquired by an attorney from his client,
touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional
employment, as privileged communications.185

The lack of any caveat anent confidentiality to “all information” is
telling. In the treatises before Wigmore, both British and American, it is
roundly presumed that all exchanges with retained counsel for legal
purposes are by nature confidential and to be kept so.186 Or as Drysdale
puts it, it is the relationship that must be confidential, not any
particularized communication.187 This duty of the lawyer — to keep the
client’s secrets, upon his honor — dates back to the earliest days of the
dishonor, but in which it is their duty to do it. Such cases, however, are rare; and
whenever they occur, they necessarily cause great pain to counsel of the right spirit.”
Id. at 523-24.
185. Parish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254, 259-60 (1856) (citing Greenough v. Gaskell,
(1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.)).
186. E.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 299 (“And in fact, the English rule, as
sustained by the weight of authority, is now, that prima facie all communications
passing between an attorney or solicitor and his client, with relation to business to be
transacted by the former for the latter, are to be deemed privileged.”); see, e.g., ELLIOTT
& ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 623, at 734 (“Communications between attorney and
client, as to legal matters, are privileged, if made for the purpose of professional advice
or aid.”); RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 579 (“The privilege is strictly confined to
communications made to counsel, solicitors, and attorneys. No others, however
confidential, or whatever be the relation or employment of the party entrusted, are
privileged.”); POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 96 (“Neither the attorney nor counsel can
be compelled nor permitted, without the consent of the client, to make any disclosure
or admission which may be fairly presumed to have been communicated by the client,
with reference to the matter in issue, under an implied promise of secrecy.”);
GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 240, at 271-72 (quoted supra note 170); TAYLOR 2D,
supra note 79, § 832, at 730-31 (quoted supra note 158); PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note
33, at 140 (“This is founded on the professional confidence, which a client reposes in
his counsel, attorney, or solicitor, and which courts of justice ever hold to be
inviolable.”); PHILLIPPS BR. 3D, supra note 151, at 108 (same); cf. Drysdale’s History,
supra note 27, § 1:5 (“It was the confidential nature of the relationship between a legal
advisor and client that gave rise to an implied pledge of secrecy—a promise that the
legal advisor would not disclose the contents of communications with his client to third
parties.”). But see also, e.g., RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 583 (“A communication made
to a solicitor, if confidential, is privileged in whatever form made; if it would be
privileged when communicated in words spoken or written, it will be privileged
equally when conveyed by means of sight instead of words.” (emphasis added)).
187. See Drysdaleon Confidentiality, supra note 27, § 6:3 & n.5 (“When the word
‘confidential’ was used, courts were referring to the professional relationship between
attorney and client, not the client’s communication.”); Drysdale’s History, supra note 27,
§ 1:5.

2021]

The Parthenogenesis of Wigmore

453

privilege.188 And if honor does not suffice, courts will exclude the
testimony, for the privilege is now of the client, not counsel.189 It is thus
held unnecessary that a client instruct counsel on what is self-evident and
presupposed: that their exchanges are to be secret.190 Only when it is
manifest that a conversation involving counsel is not meant to be held
secret191 — as when it is held amongst all the parties in common — do the
treatises hold that no privilege attaches, for the obvious reason that there
would be no expectation of it.192 Where intercourse is had with
adversaries, no litigant would suppose it would not by them be adduced
if advantageous.193
By this logic, the adversaries might subpoena a third party rather
than testify themselves makes privilege no more applicable.194 Where an
unaffiliated third party is allowed to be present, therefore, no privilege as
to the third party could be intended, and there is no expectation to protect
— though even here, Phillipps advises that the attorney still may not
testify.195 So also Powell notes that counsel’s written correspondence with
a third party in a suit is immune to discovery.196 What matters, under the
prevailing rationale, is that the client reasonably expects the matters he
188. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
189. See RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 578-79 n.(d); infra notes 217-224 and
accompanying text.
190. ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 737 (“It is not necessary that the
client should in effect enjoin secrecy.”); see POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 96 (quoted
supra note 186 as to the “implied promise of the secrecy”).
191. See GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 244, at 277 (noting no privilege would
apply “where the matter communicated was not in its nature private, and could in no
sense be termed the subject of a confidential disclosure”).
192. See WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 305 (“But where the communications are
made in the presence of all the parties to the controversy, they are not privileged, and
the evidence is competent between such parties”); id. § 159 at 338; RUSSELL 6TH, supra
note 98, at 580-81.
193. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 151a, at 331 (“A communication made to an
attorney by one party, with the intent of having it made known to the adverse party, is
not privileged.”); RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 580 & n.(m) (noting propriety of
admitting the written work of counsel provided to opposing party).
194. See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 737 (“When third persons are
present and hear the communications such persons may testify as to them.”); RUSSELL
6TH, supra note 98, at 580 & n.(u) (noting propriety of subpoenaing the clerk in a
conversation between plaintiff and defendant); PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 145
(“Propositions, which the attorney of one party has been professionally employed to
make to the adverse party, and which he made in the presence of a third person, though
they are not to be disclosed by the attorney himself, may yet be proved by the person,
who heard him deliver them.”); RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 611 (similar).
There is the matter of Drysdale, who thinks even a third party’s known presence
makes no difference to the privilege, which targets only the attorney and has no
concern for others’ presence. See Drysdale on Confidentiality, supra note 27, § 6:3 &
nn.6-7. But he writes many decades after the fact, and even he accepts that by the late
1800s, the intended presence of a third party resulted in no protection for any
communications, though this is presented as an innovation, as well it may have been,
but one prior to Wigmore. See id. at nn.8-16 (discussing Greenleaf’s views).
195. PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 145.
196. POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 101 (“[I]t has been held, that when a solicitor
writes letters to a third party for the purposes of a suit the answers are privileged.”).
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has divulged to his counsel be kept secret.197 This is again illustrated by
the fact that an attorney’s interpreters, agents, and clerks do not count as
third parties and cannot be subpoenaed, for as obvious amanuenses of
counsel they render secrecy no less presumptive.198 Taylor and Greenleaf,
indeed, comment that clerks were initially viewed with skepticism, but
their integrality to counsel’s work quickly confirmed them within the
expected bounds of privilege.199 In sum, the confidentiality (construed as
secrecy) of communications at the dawn of the twentieth century was not
an elemental prerequisite of privilege but a presupposition of attorneyclient relations.200 The rationale of Lord Brougham cannot be vindicated
otherwise,201 as so many of the treatises emphasize in quoting the Baron
at length.202
A few clarifications are in order.203 It need hardly be reiterated that
counsel, no longer protected by the pundonor, may not refuse to testify to
what he knows from sources independent of the professional relationship

197. See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 735-36 (“For the
communications to come within the rule it is essential that the relation of attorney and
client should exist, or there must at least be a belief that it does exist.”); sources cited
supra note 186. So too the contrary. E.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 151a, at 332 (“So,
generally, a communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being
made public . . . is not privileged.”); GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 244, at 277
(quoted supra note 191).
198. See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 737 (“But the rule of secrecy
extends to an interpreter, an agent, or clerk of an attorney.”); WEEKS, supra note 22, §
161, at 341-42 (clerks and interpreters); POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 101; GREENLEAF
12TH, supra note 52, § 239, at 269 & nn.2-3; TAYLOR, supra note 79, § 841, at 739;
PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 144 (“A person who acts as interpreter, or agent,
between an attorney and his client, stands precisely in the same situation as the
attorney himself; he is considered as the organ of the attorney, and is under the same
conditions of secrecy.”); RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 611 & nn.(f)-(h).
199. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 239, at 269 & n.5; TAYLOR, supra note 79, §
841, at 739.
200. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 300-01 (“‘A lawyer, no matter in what
capacity he may be employed,’ says Wharton, ‘is not, by Anglo-American law,
permitted to disclose communications made to him by his client in the course of their
professional relations. Oral communications are thus protected, and a fortiori does the
privilege extend to cases stated for the opinion of counsel, and to written instruments
held by counsel or attorneys on behalf of clients.’”); see sources cited supra notes 186,
197.
201. Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.); Bolton v.
Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.); see also WEEKS, supra
note 22, § 143, at 303-04 (“The rule requires that the entire professional intercourse
between client and attorney, whatever it may have consisted in, should be protected
by profound secrecy. The exemption is not confined to advice given or opinions stated.
It extends to facts communicated by the client—all that passes between client and
attorney in the course and for the purpose of the business.”).
202. See supra Section II-B.
203. See Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:5 & nn.1-3; see also id. § 1:9 & nn.610.
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with the client.204 True, this “exception,” as in Annesley,205 is distended
occasionally where a client’s comment to counsel is clearly gratuitous to
their professional relationship, as was post facto braggadocio “in
exultation to his attorney for having before deceived him as well as his
adversary, and for having obtained [won] his suit.”206 But as Lord Bowes
thought, this is when a “wicked” declaration exceeds any sense of
professional status.207 So too follows the well-heeled “crime-fraud
exception” to the privilege, which rightly denies the protection where the
nominal attorney is not acting in a professional capacity but as an
accomplice or conspirator in the commission of a crime.208 In the end, this
pair of exemptions are not really exceptions at all, but rather recapitulate
the definition of the privilege, as reflected by their conflation in Annesley
itself:209 that the communication to be protected must be one between
attorney and client in service of a legitimate professional relationship.210
A rill of a countercurrent in the nineteenth century might be
conjured from a few scattered notes involving decidedly outré
circumstances: Elliott & Elliott, for example, offer the peculiarity that the
presence of an academic law student — as opposed to an employed clerk
— in a lawyer’s office dispels the presupposition of privilege.211 There is

204. See RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 589; WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 300;
POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 100; TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 852, at 747-49; PHILLIPPS
AM. 2D, supra note 33, at 145-47; see also W.C. Rodgers, Privileged Communications
Between Attorney and Client, 64 CENT. L.J. 66, 70-71 (1907) (“While an attorney cannot
be required to divulge any confidential communication from his client, yet this does
not preclude him from testifying for his client in proper cases as to any facts he may
know which have not been communicated to him in confidence.”); cf. Drysdale’s
History, supra note 27, § 1:5 & n.4.
205. See supra notes 119-122.
206. RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 590 & n.(x).
207. See Hazard, supra note 23, at 1079 n.71.
208. ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 736 & n.18 (“But where the
communications are for an illegal purpose, having for their object the commission of a
crime, the privilege cannot be claimed.”); WEEKS, supra note 22, § 167, at 359; id. § 170,
at 363-64; RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 587 & n.(g) (“A very important question
arises, where a solicitor has been employed for an illegal purpose, whether any
communication in furtherance of such purpose can be considered as privileged; and
the authorities appear to be very strong that no privilege exists in such cases.”);
GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 239a, at 270 & n.13 (no privilege for a “fraudulent
combination” entered into by attorney and client).
209. See RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 587 n.(g).
210. See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 626, at 737; WEEKS, supra note 22, §
141, at 294; see also Drysdale’s History, supra note 27, § 1:5 & nn.1-3 (“When the
privilege first appeared in the sixteenth century, it protected a legal advisor from
revealing the secrets communicated by his clients to him in his professional capacity.
The privilege also was understood to protect a legal advisor's advice to his client. To
qualify, the communication must have been for a lawful purpose, as communications
for a criminal purpose did not fall within the privilege.”).
211. ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625, at 737. Perhaps the analogy is to an
attorney not actually employed in the matter at hand? See PHILLIPPS AM. 2D, supra note
33, at 145 (“A person, by profession an attorney, but not employed as attorney in the
particular business, which is the subject of inquiry, is not within the rule, although he
may have been consulted confidentially.”).
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also the repeated admonishment that secrets confessed to an arrant
dissembler to the legal profession are not privileged.212 Most troublesome
(as shall be seen) is a comment on accidental or unknown eavesdroppers,
whose tongues Greenleaf believes cannot be stayed.213 Weeks too offers
the exception of the law student, and adds that a client mistaking a law
student for a licensed lawyer forgoes the privilege.214 In all these cases
the client may very reasonably intend and believe the conversation to be
privileged, but some odd and unbeknownst quirk — be it the student,
impostor, or eavesdropper — purportedly nullifies the expectation on
which the rationale of the rule depends after Lord Brougham: that the
client be free to confess his legal case to counsel in apparently secure
environs.215 Yet these oddities are only that: the minutest cavils to a
doctrine that by the end of the nineteenth century thoroughly recognized
and protected the client’s security, irksome though such flaws may be to
legal completism.216
Finally, what of the grave matter of treachery by the attorney?
Taylor supposes that evidence voluntarily provided by a perfidious
attorney would be admissible, and then adds insult to injury, declaring
that “the mere fact that papers and other subjects of evidence have been
illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are
offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, constitutes no valid objection
to their admissibility.”217 Taylor’s endorsement of courts as majestically
aloof from even taking notice of such lawlessness,218 however, seems to
have been rejected by the end of the eighteenth century, for Russell in
1896 reprehends earlier dicta suggesting a court might admit evidence in
derogation of the privilege, finding more recent law has “set at rest” the
idea that courts would allow counsel to illegally implicate a client.219
212. See RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 580 & n.(r); POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at
101; GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 239a, at 270 & n.3; id. § 241, at 275 & n.6;
RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 611.
213. See GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 239a, at 270 & nn.1-2 (“And then the
privilege of secrecy only extends to the parties to the relation and their necessary
agents and assistants. Hence the privilege does not attach, if one is accidentally
present; or casually overhears the conversation.” (citations omitted)).
214. See WEEKS, supra note 22, § 161 at 342.
215. Cf. ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 179, § 625 at 735-36 (quoted supra note
197); GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 244 at 277 (quoted supra note 191).
216. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 186. See generally Section II-B.
217. TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 843, at 740-41. There is something of this in Weeks
as well, where he quotes an earlier tractate indicating that if privileged papers are
passed on by or purloined from an attorney, the third party who thereby gains
possession or knowledge of them may testify as to their contents, regardless of the
illegality of either the attorney’s perfidy or the third party’s theft. See WEEKS, supra
note 22, § 163, at 348. But for counsel to be allowed to accomplish via a third party
what he could not himself — violate his client’s trust — makes no sense at all under
Greenough’s rule, as Weeks himself had earlier acknowledged obliquely. See id. § 143,
at 305 (quoted infra text accompanying note 223).
218. TAYLOR 2D, supra note 79, § 843, at 740-41 (“For the Court will not notice
whether they were obtained lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it raise an issue to
determine that question.”).
219. RUSSELL 6TH, supra note 98, at 578-79 n.(d).
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Russell’s 1828 edition already holds the law “will neither oblige nor
suffer” an attorney’s breach,220 and Powell in 1869 that attorneys can be
neither “compelled nor permitted” to do so.221 Greenleaf writes in 1866
that such counsel “are not only justified in withholding such matters, but
bound to withhold them,”222 and Weeks likewise writes in 1892 that “[a]s
the rule is one chiefly for the protection of the client, the willingness of
the attorney to divulge the privileged communications is not enough to
warrant receiving them.”223 Even aside such consensus, it would be quite
contrary to the rationale of Lord Brougham that Taylor embraces so
heartily were courts to countenance evidence when the client’s privilege
is proposed to be violated by his own counsel.224

III. THE AMERICAN ARCHITECT OF PRIVILEGE LAW: JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE
Sir William Holdsworth, so greatly esteemed by Drysdale,225 writes
of Wigmore in 1934:
[T]he later years of the nineteenth and the first years of the present century
may be regarded as the heroic age of the study in America of AngloAmerican legal history. If England, in the first half of the seventeenth
century, can boast such names as Selden, Spelman, Lambard, Bacon, Coke
and Prynne, America in the later years of the nineteenth and the first years
of the twentieth century can boast such names as Holmes, Langdell,
Bigelow, Ames, Thayer,[226] Gray, and Wigmore. Of the contributions to
legal history of these great men Dean Wigmore’s contribution ranks very
high both in quantity, and, what is far more important, in quality. Moreover,
his work has a characteristic, which is not found to anything like the same
extent in the writings of the other great American lawyers who have done
so much to elucidate the problems of Anglo-American legal history. This
characteristic is the large knowledge which he possesses of foreign systems
of law, and the skilful use which he makes of this knowledge to elucidate
the history of Anglo-American law.227

220. RUSSELL 2D, supra note 164, at 610.
221. POWELL 3D, supra note 157, at 96 (quoted supra note 186).
222. GREENLEAF 12TH, supra note 52, § 237, at 267.
223. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 305.
224. Compare TAYLOR, supra note 79, § 843, at 740-41, with id. §§ 834-35, at 73234. Perhaps, given Taylor’s relatively early posture in 1855, there remained then some
confusion between the modern privilege’s full contours and the pundonor under which
the privilege and its waiver rested with the attorney. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, §
2290, at 3195-96 (quoted supra note 150); supra notes 124-126; e.g., supra note 184;
see also Pye, supra note 65, at 16 (“Originally, the privilege seemed to be based upon
the honor of the attorney and belonged to the attorney, who could waive it. During the
18th century, the courts found a new rationale in protecting the client from
apprehension that his confidences might be betrayed. By the middle of the 19th
century it was recognized that the privilege belonged to the client.”).
225. See supra note 67.
226. Of whom see more below, infra notes 288-296 and accompanying text.
227. Sir William S. Holdsworth, Wigmore as a Legal Historian, 29 ILL. L. REV. 448,
448 (1935).
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Before turning to the matter of Wigmore’s magnum opus of 19041905 and its novel treatment of confidentiality, it is profitable to indulge
a modest divagation to examine the man who penned it. If such a legal
revolution is to spring from a single mind, one might think the cultivation
and application of that mind matter. So they do, and the life of Wigmore
is one well worth perusing even from afar.228

A. Wigmore: A Précis of a Precise Life’s Work229
Wigmore was born in San Francisco on March 4, 1863.230 Eschewing
more local options, he matriculated at Harvard for both his
undergraduate and legal education, graduating from the latter in 1887.231
Whilst there, he fell under the tutelage of Professor James Bradley Thayer,
a widely regarded eminence in the law of evidence.232 He also
demonstrated his penchant for written scholarship by his role in founding
the Harvard Law Review,233 based on a conviction that the professors and
academics there “had a message for the professional world” and that
228. So worthwhile, indeed, that a nigh-countless number of legal authors have
done so before. Perhaps most notable is William R. Roalfe, who was Wigmore’s first
biographer and also published an accessible twenty-five page sketch of his larger work.
See William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore—Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 277 (1962) [hereinafter Roalfe]. As Roalfe provides an
accounting of the prior literature concerning Wigmore as of his 1962 writing, there is
no call for duplication here. Id. at 277 n.*. There have, of course, been many works
since, many published in the journal of the Northwestern University School of Law that
Wigmore so long superintended. See, e.g., ANDREW PORWANCHER, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE
AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (U. Missouri 2016); Joel Fishman & Joshua Boston, John
Henry Wigmore: A Sesquicentennial Celebration, in 6 UNBOUND: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF
LEGAL HISTORY AND RARE BOOKS 9-16 (2013); Richard D. Friedman, John Henry Wigmore,
in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 587-89 (R.K. Newman ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2009); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985);
David S. Ruder, John Henry Wigmore: A Great Academic Leader, 75 (suppl.) NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (1981); James A. Rahl, Wigmore as Professor and Dean, 75 (suppl.) NW. U. L. REV.
4 (1981); Fred E. Inbau, John Henry Wigmore and Scientific Evidence: A Personal Note,
75 (suppl.) NW. U. L. REV. 8 (1981); Kenneth W. Abbott, Wigmore: The Japanese
Connection, 75 (suppl.) NW. U. L. REV. 10 (1981); Kurt Schwerin, Preface and
Bibliography, 75 (suppl.) NW. U. L. REV. 18 (1981); Felix Frankfurter, John Henry
Wigmore: A Centennial Tribute, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (1963); William R. Roalfe, John
Henry Wigmore: 1863-1943, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 445; Arthur J. Goldberg, Wigmore:
Teacher and Humanitarian, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1963); John M. Maguire, Wigmore:
Two Centuries, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 456 (1963); Sarah B. Morgan, Wigmore: The Man, 58
NW. U. L. REV. 461 (1963); John Reid, Brandy in His Water: Correspondence Between Doe,
Holmes, and Wigmore, 57 NW. U. L. REV. 522 (1962).
229. See Morgan, supra note 228, at 462 (relating, as Wigmore’s secretary for
twenty-four years, that “Mr. Wigmore was a meticulous worker”).
230. PORWANCHER, supra note 228, at 7; Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 10;
Roalfe, supra note 228, at 297.
231. PORWANCHER, supra note 228, at 8-9; Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 10;
Roalfe, supra note 228, at 287.
232. See Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993);
Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 909 (1937).
233. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 10.
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“their pioneer work in legal education was not yet but ought to be well
appreciated by the profession.”234 Following a brief stint in private
practice after graduation, Wigmore was put forward by Harvard’s
president to be a visiting professor at Tokyo’s Keio University, arriving to
take up his position in 1889.235 The timing was telling: Meiji Japan was
rapidly westernizing its system of law and shedding its formal feudal
forms, installing a new criminal code in 1881 and civil code in 1893, and
reordering its judiciary in 1890.236 Wigmore’s advent thus placed him at
the epicenter of the wholesale redrafting and systematization of a
nation’s legal system, providing perhaps some inspiration for his own
future efforts.237
On his return to the United States in 1893, Wigmore accepted a
professorial appointment at Northwestern University, where he was to
spend the rest of his professional career.238 He was soon thereafter
selected to redact the sixteenth edition of Greenleaf’s seminal work on
evidence, which was released in 1899.239 His biography in the Yale
Encyclopedia relates that he “poured his massive energies into the
project” despite the fact that its organization was “badly dated,” inspiring
Wigmore to contemplate a new treatment of the subject that could shed
the trappings of the incoherent law of the past through a completely novel
methodization.240 Nonetheless, such was Wigmore’s aptitude that the
revised sixteenth edition, whatever the weaknesses of its aging
foundations, won the first Ames Prize for legal scholarship awarded by
Harvard University.241 Perhaps not coincidentally, in 1901, he was
appointed dean of the Northwestern University School of Law, a post he
would occupy for several decades.242 (As it will be developed in far
greater detail later, Wigmore’s preparation and release of his great
treatise on evidence in 1904 and 1905 may be pretermitted for the
present.243)
Wigmore proved a frenetically active dean at Northwestern prior to
the Great War.244 From the start of his career at Northwestern, he was
(despite his more academic predilections) a prolific fundraiser and
proponent of the university that competed with its crosstown rival, the
University of Chicago,245 greatly expanding its physical plant and financial
234. PORWANCHER, supra note 228, at 9; see Friedman, supra note 228, at 587.
235. PORWANCHER, supra note 228, at 12; see also Abbott, supra note 228, at 10;
Roalfe, supra note 228, at 297.
236. See PORWANCHER, supra note 228, at 12.
237. See Abbott, supra note 228, at 10.
238. Friedman, supra note 228, at 588; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 294 (five
decades); id. at 297.
239. See Friedman, supra note 228, at 588.
240. Id.
241. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 13; Friedman, supra note 228, at
588.
242. Friedman, supra note 228, at 588.
243. See infra Section III-B.
244. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 12-13.
245. See Rahl, supra note 228, at 6; see also Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at
12.
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resources.246 Closer to his heart, he established a friendly epistolary
rapport with Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who shared his interest in the
Anglo-American tradition of common law, and which rapport evolved
from mentorship into a relation of equals as the years passed and
Wigmore’s own eminence became ever more apparent.247 It appears
vindicated in 1910 when Wigmore dedicated his Pocket Guide of Evidence
to Holmes as “Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in Grateful
Acknowledgment of Lofty Ideals Voiced and Exemplified for Our
Profession and of Many Tokens of Kindness shown to the Author.”248 For
his part, after expressing humble appreciation, Holmes proceeded to
grouse about Wigmore’s friendly association with the Chief Justice of New
Hampshire Charles Cogswell Doe, whom Holmes accused rightly of
“pirat[ing]” some of his writings.249
Wigmore’s interest in the practical applications of law found
purchase in the emerging sciences of sociology and criminology, which he
worked extensively to integrate in the organs and practice of the law.250
The American Institute of Criminal Law & Criminology and the ABA
Section on Criminal Law emerged apace under his auspices.251 In 1910,
he had founded Northwestern’s own Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology, much as he had been amongst the founders of Harvard’s law
review over two decades prior.252 Yet for all his interest in newfangled
theories of criminal and social science,253 Wigmore’s eye never strayed
too far from historical context: in 1912, Professor Albert Kocourek, a close
colleague at Northwestern, observed that “Wigmore with the historian’s
vision of the mutability of legal institutions, and of the persistence of welldefined cycles of development in social affairs, has recognized that our
legal system is in a transitional stage of evolution, the embryotic course
of which is mirrored in the legal history of Rome.”254 In 1913, continuing
his lifelong quest at systematization of the law, Wigmore released his
Principles of Judicial Proof as Given by Logic, Psychology, and General
Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, commenting that “the book
aspires to offer, though in tentative form only, a novum organum for the
study of Judicial Evidence.”255
246. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 12; Friedman, supra note 228, at
588-89; Ruder, supra note 228, at 3.
247. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 12.
248. Reid, supra note 228, at 529.
249. Id. at 529-30.
250. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 281-83.
251. Id.
252. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 13; Friedman, supra note 228, at
588; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 278.
253. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 281-82.
254. Albert Kocourek, John Henry Wigmore: A Personal Portrait, 24 GREEN BAG 3
(1912), reprinted in 13 ILL. L. REV. 340, 342 (1918) [hereinafter Kocourek, A Personal
Portrait].
255. Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 14 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE,
AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 1 (1913)); see Friedman, supra note 228, at 588;
Roalfe, supra note 228, at 288 (quoting same). The reference of novum organum, or a
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Then came the War. Wigmore volunteered for service upon taking a
leave of absence from Northwestern, and was commissioned under joint
assignments to the Provost Marshall General and Judge Advocate
General’s offices as a major, rising to the rank of colonel before his
honorable discharge.256 His then secretary, Sarah B. Morgan, who
returned to civilian life with him to serve for the rest of his career,257
recalls the extraordinary hours Wigmore worked between his “many and
varied tasks,” until Mrs. Wigmore put an end to Morgan’s late-night
attendance, although the wife could not do the same for her husband.258
After the War’s end, Wigmore received the Distinguished Service Medal
for his efforts.259 Yet even his military service yielded scholarship:
amongst others publications,260 Wigmore’s Source-Book of Military and
War-Time Legislation of 1919 was widely regarded as a revolution in the
study of the field.261 So too did he keep up his unflagging work for
Northwestern, even during the War.262 Although much of academia and
the bench has ever regarded him as Professor or Dean Wigmore,263 the
man’s titular preference was the colonelcy that he had earned in defense
of his country.264
“new approach,” refers foremost to Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum of 1680, which
sought to update the practice of systematic logic, addressing Aristotle’s works
collected as the Organum laying out the precepts of logical inference.
256. See Morgan, supra note 228, at 461; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 295.
257. Morgan, supra note 228, at 461.
258. Id.
259. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 295; see 32 C.F.R. § 578.11 (2021) (“The
performance must be such as to merit recognition for service which is clearly
exceptional. Exceptional performance of normal duty will not alone justify an award of
this decoration.”).
260. See, e.g., John Henry Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom
of Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920); John Henry
Wigmore, Suggested Memorandum on War Service, 3 A.B.A. J. 341 (1917); John Henry
Wigmore, Editorial Note, The Lawyer's Honor in War-Time, 12 ILL. L. REV. 117 (1917).
261. U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND SPECIAL TRAINING, A
SOURCE-BOOK OF MILITARY LAW AND WAR-TIME LEGISLATION (John Henry Wigmore ed.
1919); see Roalfe, supra note 228, at 290.
262. Morgan, supra note 228, at 461.
263. See David Werner Amram, Editorial Note, John H. Wigmore, 67 U. PA. L. REV.
80, 81 (1919) (“He will, however, to those who really know him, never be Colonel
Wigmore. Such titles may well be reserved for lesser men. Neither shoulder straps nor
military title have added anything to the distinction which his native genius long since
conferred upon him. We shall think of him as Professor Wigmore, the great scholar and
teacher, author and editor, or simply as Wigmore, a fountain of energy and inspiration
. . . .”); e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1963)
(“Dean Wigmore”); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (same);.
264. Inbau, supra note 228, at 9 (“The range of my discussions with the ‘Colonel’—
which I, as well as many others, always called him in deference to his choice of this
Army Reserve title to that of Dean—went beyond technical subjects.”); see Friedman,
supra note 228, at 589 (“He rose to the rank of colonel, a title he continued to relish
long after returning to academia . . . .”); Roalfe, supra note 228, at 299 (“This final
resting place [at Arlington] not only gave recognition to Wigmore’s wartime
contribution but, at the same time, took account of the fact that he sometimes seemed
to feel a greater pride when identified as ‘Colonel,’ a title affectionately used by many
of his friends, than as the author of The Treatise on Evidence.”).
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In the 1930s, Wigmore’s penchant for systematization alighted upon
another target, the comparative law of different nations, stirred by his
deep inculcation in the newly-wrought Japanese legal system in his early
career.265 (Indeed, he published his first installment in the series
Materials for the Study of Private Law in Old Japan in 1892 during his
appointment at Keio,266 together with numerous other works on Japan
over his career.267) The result was his magisterial three-volume
Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems, providing a survey of sixteen
different countries’ jurisprudence.268 Once again, a practical approach
was at the heart of Wigmore’s work: the “Panorama’s intent was to
popularize the study of comparative law and to familiarize legal scholars
with some of the patterns of law that appeared in various legal
systems.”269 So betaken was Wigmore with his mission that following his
retirement as dean of Northwestern,270 he returned to Japan in 1935 to
oversee the continuing project of collating and translating Tokugawanera legal sources that he had set in motion over forty years before.271 This
only continued his long interest in the subject that had been roused by his
early sojourn and never waned.272
As may be apparent, from the start of his career, Wigmore’s “flood of
writing, journalistic as well as legal, continued unabated.”273 Never in his
life did Wigmore retire from the study of the law; it seemed he could
not.274 To call Wigmore merely prolific denies him his due: the
Northwestern University Law Review catalogues nearly one thousand
publications over the course of his lifetime, nigh unto his demise, equating
to an average of sixteen-odd items every year he was a lawyer, spanning
seven decades.275 Roalfe writes: “The sheer magnitude of the achievement
is almost impossible fully to appreciate until one has seen the total
brought together in one place and it is realized that it occupies more than
18 feet of shelf space or an entire section of standard library shelving.”276
Indeed, Wigmore’s final work, Bullets or Boycotts: Which Shall be the
Measure to Enforce World Peace?, was published posthumously.277
265. See Abbott, supra note 228, at 13-14.
266. Schwerin, supra note 228, at 52; see Roalfe, supra note 228, at 288.
267. See generally Schwerin, supra note 228.
268. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 14-15; Abbott, supra note 228, at
13-15; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 289.
269. Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 15 (citing Abbott, supra note 228, at 13).
270. See Rahl, supra note 228, at 4, 7.
271. Abbott, supra note 228, at 12-3.
272. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 295 (also noting his responsibility for organizing
the ABA Section of International and Comparative Law); Fishman & Boston, supra note
228, at 11.
273. Friedman, supra note 228, at 588.
274. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 299; see also Friedman, supra note 228, at 588
(noting perhaps mordantly that Wigmore was “[s]till active in his early 80s,” as he
turned eighty only a month before his demise).
275. Schwerin, supra note 228; accord Roalfe, supra note 228, at 291 (providing a
similar computation).
276. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 291.
277. Schwerin, supra note 228, at 51; see Roalfe, supra note 228, at 299.
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Wigmore was returning from a meeting of the editorial board of the
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology he had founded so many years
before when he met a sudden death in a “freakish”278 taxicab collision.279
It was April 20, 1943, and Wigmore was eighty years of age.280 Wrote his
long-time friend and colleague Albert Kocourek in memoriam:281 “But for
a stupid mischance he might have lived into his nineties like his senior
contemporaries, Holmes and Pollock. Fata obstabant. In a short hour the
world of legal science shrank to a small and poorer dimension.”282
Perhaps Kocourek might have added: sic transit gloria mundi.283

B. A Legal Magnum Opus for the Twentieth Century
Not to be outdone by Sir William,284 Edmund M. Morgan and John
MacArthur Maguire write in Wigmore’s own natal Harvard Law Review in
1937 that during the preceding half century, “these two, James Bradley
Thayer and John Henry Wigmore, bestrode the narrow world of evidence
like a colossus.”285 Having digressed upon the life of Wigmore, what of
Thayer?286
James Bradley Thayer has been mentioned already as an authority
in the law of evidence and mentor of the young Wigmore.287 But in
Thayer’s much-heralded Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
278. Friedman, supra note 228, at 589.
279. Inbau, supra note 228, at 8; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 276-277; see also
Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 16; Friedman, supra note 228, at 589.
280. See Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 16; Roalfe, supra note 228, at 299.
281. See Schwerin, supra note 228, at 17 (“Professor Albert Kocourek (1875-1952),
the outstanding authority on jurisprudence, . . . was one of Wigmore’s closest
associates on the faculty of the Law School.”); Kocourek, A Personal Portrait, supra note
254, at 342; id. at 345 (“To say of Mr. Wigmore that he is unaffected, generous, noble,
an untiring worker, a stanch friend, a valuable citizen, a great lawyer, an accomplished
jurist, a cultured gentleman, is to employ the stock nouns and adjectives of obituary
literature.”).
282. Albert Kocourek, John Henry Wigmore, 27 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 122, 124 (1943)
[hereinafter Kocourek, In Eulogy]; see also Fishman & Boston, supra note 228, at 16
(quoting Kocourek); Roalfe, supra note 228, at 299 (same). The Latin phrase translates
to “Fate stood in the way.”
283. The Latin maxim translates to “thus passes the glory of the world.” See Jaksha
v. State, 385 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Neb. 1986) (rendering as “so passes away the glory of
the world”); e.g., State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421, 438 (W. Va.
1973) (Neely, J., dissenting) (“The history of liberty is the history of legislatures. When
once the Legislature has been divested of its traditional power of the purse it will stand
like Stonehenge as a useless and incomprehensible monument to a past era. Sic transit
gloria mundi.”); see also, e.g., Jones v. Harshbarger, 303 S.E.2d 668, 685 (W. Va. 1983)
(quoting Brotherton as “conclud[ing] with magnificent grandness”).
284. See supra note 227.
285. Morgan & Maguire, supra note 232, at 909 (referring to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CÆSAR, act I, sc.ii, ll.143-44).
286. Alas, this Article is not a tribute to Thayer as such, but such articles have
rightly have been written as well. See generally, e.g., G. Edward White, Revisiting James
Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 48 (1993); Morgan & Maguire, supra note 232; Hook,
supra note 232.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 227 & 232.
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Law of 1898288 may be seen vividly a secular John the Baptist289 preceding
Wigmore’s montane sermon on evidence of 1904.290 Indeed, Thayer
“demonstrated the insufficiency of all previous studies in this field, and
pointed the way for all future scholars.”291 This is because Thayer finally,
at the dawn of the twentieth century, laid bare the incoherence of existing
precedents and treatises both and the concomitant need for assimilating
them into a principled whole and yet, the work he penned was not one
addressing that need but of an historical and philosophical bent.292 The
treatise interrogates the very concept of evidence and the development
thereof from the earliest days of English law through the then-present,293
yet offers only desultory advice thereafter to the practitioner. Critics
noticed; the Yale Law Journal Book Review observes that “the book is,
perhaps, quite as much an attempt to mould the law of evidence as to state
it.”294 It continues: “From this it results that its value is as a source of
suggestion and as an aid to clearer thinking on some of the difficult
problems of evidence rather than as a statement of the law as it is, to be
studied as such.”295 Recognizing this, Thayer offers a modest apology: “I
have a good hope, when the present volume is completed, of
supplementing it, before long, by another, in similar form but of a more
immediately practical character, giving a concise statement of the existing
law of evidence.”296 But that was not to be writ by him, for Thayer died
but a few years later in 1902, leaving his intended work undone.297
It was Thayer’s disciple instead that would see his hope given shape;
it remained to Wigmore “to present the complete picture,”298 though
Wigmore did respectfully dedicate his work to “the memory of the public
services and the private friendship of two masters of the law of evidence
Charles Doe of New Hampshire and James Bradley Thayer of
Massachusetts.”299 But the resulting statement was not to be “concise,” as
Thayer had imagined.300 Roalfe has calculated that in the first edition of
1904 to 1905, Wigmore had collected 40,000 citations to legal opinions,
which already mind-boggling number expanded to 55,000 in the second
288. THAYER, supra note 29.
289. Cf. Matthew 3:3; Mark 1:2-3.
290. See Holdsworth, supra note 227, at 453 (“To some extent, as Dean Wigmore
says, the trail had been blazed by Thayer’s pioneer treatise”); Epaphroditus Peck, The
Rigidity of the Rule Against Hearsay, 21 YALE L.J. 257, 258 (1912) (“This academic work
of Professor Thayer laid the foundation for the magnum opus of Professor Wigmore”).
291. Morgan & Maguire, supra note 232, at 909.
292. See THAYER, supra note 29, at 3-5; see also Morgan & Maguire, supra note 232,
at 909.
293. THAYER, supra note 29, at 7-182.
294. Book Review, 8 YALE L.J. 216, 217 (1899).
295. Id.
296. THAYER, supra note 29, at 5.
297. Hook, supra note 232, at 8.
298. Holdsworth, supra note 227, at 453; accord Hook, supra note 232, at 5 (“The
neglected treatise was completed by Thayer’s student, John Henry Wigmore.”); see also
Peck, supra note 290, at 258.
299. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 284 n.51.
300. THAYER, supra note 29, at 5.
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edition of 1923, and to 85,000 in the third of 1940.301 A supplemented by
statutory and literary references, the third edition — the last revised by
Wigmore himself before his untimely death — comprises 7,324 pages,
and Roalfe offers visual proof of the size, noting that the complete oeuvre
taken together occupies a full “four and one-half feet of shelf space.”302
Kocourek, writing later, estimated the necessary work on the first edition
alone to have involved “10 years of monastic toiling,”303 whilst Wigmore
himself placed it at fifteen years, crediting his indefatigable wife as his
“devoted co-laborer for fifteen years without whose arduous and skillful
toil this work could never have been completed.”304 Although duly
accepting Wigmore’s attribution to his wife, Roalfe identified several
other factors that recommended Wigmore for such an Atlantean
burden.305 These he identifies as Wigmore’s prodigious speed at reading,
his equal powers of concentration on the task at hand, a great skill and
interest in systematic organization, and “an unusual capacity for
sustained effort.”306

C. The Miraculous Parthenogenesis of a Confidentiality
Requirement
Before turning fully to Wigmore’s parthenogenesis, it must be noted
that no less a personage in ethical philosophy than Jeremy Bentham
staunchly opposed the whole notion of privilege itself,307 as Wigmore
himself (again, commendably) recorded.308 Bentham makes short work of
the concept of the pundonor that was only recently extinct as of his
writing of 1827.309 The greater weight of his argument is against the
modern client-oriented protection, arguing at base that an innocent man
has nothing to fear, and a guilty man should not be abetted by the law to
secure his freedom despite his guilt.310 Bentham also adverts to the thenexisting discrepancy between legal counsel and other confidential (i.e.
professional) relationships such as doctors, who at the time enjoyed no
privilege,311 though that omission has since been filled.312 Attention is

301. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 283-84.
302. Id. at 283.
303. Kocourek, In Eulogy, supra note 282, at 123.
304. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 284 n.51.
305. Id. at 283.
306. Id.
307. BENTHAM, supra note 181, at 302-25.
308. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3199-3201.
309. See BENTHAM, supra note 181, at 302-03 (“The law adviser is neither to be
compelled, nor so much as suffered, to betray the trust thus reposed in him. Not
suffered? Why not? Oh, because to betray a trust is treachery; and an act of treachery
is an immoral act.”); see also supra Section II-A-2 (detailing the development and
deprecation of the attorney’s pundonor privilege).
310. Id. at 303-05.
311. BENTHAM, supra note 181, at 306.
312. See Shuman, supra note 38 (analyzing the physician-patient privilege under
Wigmore’s protocol).
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drawn to the admittedly knotty legal problem that animated so many
early English cases in discerning whether an attorney is acting in a
professional capacity or a familiar one; Bentham places great weight on
the supposed impossibility of dissecting the one from the other.313 And
Bentham preemptively contemns the edict of Lord Brougham (which, in
fairness, did not quite yet exist in 1827) that the client be free to share his
story with counsel in safety:
Not with safety? So much the better. To what object is the whole system of
penal law directed, if it be not that no man shall have it in his power to
flatter himself with the hope of safety, in the event of his engaging in the
commission of an act which the law, on account of its supposed
mischievousness, has thought fit to prohibit? The argument employed as a
reason against the compelling such disclosure, is the very argument that
pleads in favour of it.314

In the end, Bentham’s argument, elegantly laid out as it is and aided
by sophisticated rhetoric, reduces to its first principle: that an innocent
man needs no privilege, and a guilty man ought not be abetted by the
law.315 Wigmore admits that “[a]t first sight, the Benthamic argument
seems irresistible.”316 The essential flaw in Bentham’s reasoning
corresponds to the fundamental axiom of Anglo-American criminal law:
that no man is guilty until proven so,317 and thus the protections of the
privilege are necessary to protect the innocent lest they be wrongly found
guilty.318 The Supreme Court traces the origins of this axiom to Ancient
Greece and Rome, and notes that Greenleaf locates its origins in the Bible
itself.319 And in non-criminal matters, the security of legal advice serves
to deter many unworthy causes from being brought in the first place.320
Despite Bentham’s justifiably heralded legacy, his commentaries on the
law of privilege do not stand up to scrutiny, and failed to sway the
scholars and jurists of his century, who universally accepted the need for
the privilege.321
Wigmore parted ways with Bentham as well, but perhaps not so
much as his predecessors.322 Indeed, Morgan & McGuire observe that
313. Id. at 306 (“Quære, by what sign to know when it is the attorney who is
present, and when it is the friend? In the case of the counsel, there might have been
less difficulty: the professional robe, by being off or on, might distinguish the counsel
from the friend.”).
314. Id. at 310.
315. Id. at 303-307.
316. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3202.
317. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Fundamental to the AngloAmerican jurisprudence of criminal law is the premise that an individual is to be
treated as innocent until proven guilty by a jury of his or her peers.”).
318. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3202-03; see also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 71, at 352 (“[A]ll presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously:
for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer.”).
319. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-56 (1895).
320. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3203.
321. See supra Section II-B.
322. See supra notes 316-320.
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“Wigmore gave to America a critique resembling that of Bentham in
England, but in far superior and more comprehensive fashion.”323
Wigmore accepts readily that, historically, the supposition of attorneyclient secrecy was so presumptive it need not even be stated.324 What
initially differs from prior treatises is his restatement of the rationale
underpinning not just attorney-client privilege but any privileges
whatsoever, à la Bentham. Wigmore explicated:
Looking back at the principle of Privilege, as an exception to the general
liability of every person to give testimony to all facts inquired of in a court
of justice, and having in view that preponderance of extrinsic policy which
alone can justify the recognition of any such exception (ante, §§ 2192,
2197), four fundamental conditions may be predicated as necessary to the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications
between persons standing in a given relation. (1) The communications
must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) This
element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be
one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered;
and (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation325

Only the last of these principles stray from those of Lord Brougham.
The first, if confidentiality is properly read as a question of a professional
arrangement, faithfully replicates the trust that the Lord Chancellor
explained must attend legal communications lest “every one would be
thrown upon his own legal resources.”326 So too the second recapitulates
the requirement than an attorney so trusted be acting in a legal
capacity.327 With the third, Wigmore did not advance the argument, for he
agreed, contra Bentham, that the attorney-client privilege ought to be
recognized.328 But in the fourth, Wigmore proposed the basis of his
divisive innovation: that a balancing test must be imposed as to
importance of inadmissibility versus its proof-making value. Armed with
such a test, he could impose burdens on the privilege in the guise of tests
of “how important” a communication was, versus the undisputed value of
truth and full disclosure to the judicial process. In short, the balancing test
made viable in principle the idea of violating a reasonably intended
privilege involuntarily if the utterer or proponent did not sufficiently
demonstrate the importance of its inviolacy. From this, Wigmore derived
and promulgated the pithy test for the attorney-client privilege that
would underpin and animate so many cases even unto the early days of
323. Morgan & Maguire, supra note 232, at 909.
324. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194 (“Clearly the attorney and the
barrister are under a solemn pledge of secrecy, not less binding because it is implied
and seldom expressed.”).
325. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2285, at 3185.
326. Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.) (quoted
supra note 133).
327. See supra notes 203-210 and accompanying text.
328. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3202-04.
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the twenty-first century:329
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the client waives the protection.330

The intersection of item four and eight enact Wigmore’s revolution
in privilege, construing any lapse in perfect secrecy (as Wigmore wrongly
conceived confidentiality) as a voluntary waiver of the privilege,
apparently by a legal fiction,331 given even Wigmore saw matters of
thieves or eavesdroppers were in fact involuntary:
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of
documents from the attorney’s possession, are not protected by the
privilege, on the principle (post, § 2326) that, since the law has granted
secrecy so far as its own process goes, it leaves to the client and attorney to
take measures of caution sufficient to prevent the overhearing of third
persons ; and the risk of insufficient precautions is upon the client. This
principle applies equally to documents.332
The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of
exemption from its processes of disclosure against himself or the attorney
or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is
necessary for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of
preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client’s hands, and
since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial liability and
should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition
to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who
overhears the communication, whether with or without the client’s
knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule
ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.333

Wigmore was wrong; waiver of a right requires a voluntary and
knowing decision, or else it is compulsion.334 Still, there was some textual
provender with which Wigmore worked his personal will.335 Taylor, of
329. See Sunshine, supra note *, at 646 n.39 (citing the majority of circuits as
adopting Wigmore’s test prior to 2008 and the enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 502).
330. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2292, at 3204 (oblique case rendered in Roman).
331. Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981) (“The Court specifically noted
that the right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requiring the special
protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.”); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary
but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); see also EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 508 (Am. Bar Assoc. 6th
ed. 2017) (“In other domains of the law waiver entails a knowing, voluntary, conscious
and intelligent relinquishment of that right by the holder thereof.”).
332. Id. § 2325, at 3251.
333. Id. § 2326, at 3251-52 (emphasis added).
334. Cf. sources cited supra note 331.
335. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 305 (No privilege would apply “where
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course, in passing, had agreed,336 even if all his contemporaries did not,
and rebuked him.337 Recall also the aside in Greenleaf as to
eavesdroppers;338 once this was combined with the principle that an
exchange with counsel in the known presence of adversaries or third
parties could not restrict them,339 the admixture yielded a potent poison.
Given the philosophical underpinnings that Wigmore had enunciated,
what difference did it make that the third party was intended or
unintended?340 The ineluctable result of this questionable line of
induction was evident: should any person other than the client and
attorney (and the attorney’s necessary agents, Wigmore allowed,341
following his predecessors recognizing clerks and the like342) gain
knowledge of the privileged conversation, the privilege would not survive
the inadvertent dissemination.343 It was thus incumbent on the
proponent of the privilege to ensure none other come to know the secrets
imparted should she wish the privilege be preserved.344 This was a
marked departure from the stance of the lawbooks preceding Wigmore,
where it was assumed (pace the stray comment in Greenleaf345 and the
universally denounced dicta of Taylor346) that a conversation with
counsel was to be kept secret, that the courts should enforce such, and
only the deliberate inclusion of a free agent whom all knew might testify
at his will could compromise such professional confidentiality.347 Again,
none thought that a shouted exchange with an attorney across a public
house where all might obviously hear could accrue privilege, but that was
because no sane client could imagine it would be insulated from the body
of evidence given all the ears that heard and might testify.348 Wigmore’s
innovation was to eradicate the reasonable subjective expectation of the
client, and install in its place an objective test of whether the
communication in fact was and remained secret to all but client, counsel,

the matter communicated was not in its nature private, and could in no sense be
termed the subject of a confidential disclosure . . . The test seems to be: Are the
communications confidential? Are they necessary in the course of business?”). Even
here, the paired questions suggest that the question of “confidentiality” is more of the
nature of whether the communication is made in a confidential or professional
relationship, before proceeding to inquire whether an exemption — that is a
communication not consistent with the confidential or professional relationship —
applies. It must be admitted, however, that the comment as to privacy provides ample
fodder, even qualified as it is by the subsequent test.
336. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 219-224 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 213and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 193-196.
340. WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2325-26, at 3521-22.
341. Id. § 2326, at 3251-52; see § 2320, at 3219.
342. See supra notes 198-200.
343. WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2325-26, at 3521-22.
344. Id.
345. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 186.
348. See supra notes 191-192, 197.
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and their appendages.349
Bentham’s is a broadside repudiation of Lord Brougham and the
rationale espoused in Greenough and Bolton. That reasoning had been
based in ensuring the client’s perceived safety in divulging his sins to a
legal confessor, that competent representation might be had.350 Yet
Wigmore had the audacity — or, more amiably put, the self-possession —
to coolly quote the late Lord Brougham351 in support of his theorem that
the client’s expectation and reliance were irrelevant should those
divulgences travel further, whether by accident, her own fault, her
attorney’s, or a malefactor’s.352 That pronouncement simply disregarded
the real-world assessments of virtually every nineteenth century treatise
and Lord Brougham himself.353 Wigmore, however, concluded his
analysis of Bentham, a similarly philosophical soul, thus:
[T]he privilege remains an anomaly. Its benefits are all indirect and
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. Even the answers to
Bentham’s argument concede that it is accurate and well-founded in its
application to a certain proportion of cases. It is worth preserving for
the sake of a general policy; but it is none the less an obstacle to the
investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.354

Some indication of Wigmore’s motivations may be gleaned from his
many friends and eulogists. His much-cited confidante Kocourek
explains: “He insists on progress, and progress means for him
understanding and power. Anything which opposes this progress is cast
aside. Individuals here mean nothing, and the idea is everything. It is easy
to be virtuous.”355 Evan Alfred Evans, then a judge of the Seventh Circuit,
adds: “He waged a ceaseless war on imperfect law, or law as is, but which
needed growth and development. He was the persistent foe of laws that
lagged behind the advance of commerce or the accepted course of
conduct in any other field.”356 Roalfe, his archetypal biographer,
summarizes: “Whenever he encountered a situation which called for a
remedy he was apparently impelled to work out a solution or at least
devise a step forward by way of improvement. Usually, he was not
satisfied merely with a written attack on the problem. He went into action
. . . .”357 The parthenogenesis of Wigmore is not a product of selfrealization, but of problem-solving, as Roalfe concludes: “[B]ecause of his
inherent modesty he seldom, if ever, stood in the way of the goal he
349. See supra notes 332-333.
350. Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.); Bolton v.
Corp. of Liverpool, (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch.).
351. WIGMORE, supra note 12 § 2291, at 3197.
352. Id. §§ 2325-26, at 3521-22.
353. See supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text. Contra TAYLOR 2D, supra note
79, § 843, at 740-41; see also WEEKS, supra note 22, § 163, at 348.
354. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 3204.
355. Kocourek, A Personal Portrait, supra note 254, at 346.
356. Evan Alfred Evans, On Behalf of the Bench, 34 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 75, 76
(1943) (quoted in Roalfe, supra note 228, at 294 n.118).
357. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 294.
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envisioned by making his personal aggrandizement the first
consideration. He kept his gaze on the objective and not on himself.”358
Once Wigmore had settled upon the proper logical point to be achieved,
the individual applications, or indeed his own acclaim, meant little
compared to the promulgation of the austere principle.
Drysdale rightly observes that the feeble historical basis for
Wigmore’s parthenogenesis can best be considered one of misapplied
terminology: earlier treatises spoke of “confidential communications,”
yet they did not mean communications made in secret, but rather
communications made within the context of a confidential — that is,
professional — legal relationship.359 This is well illustrated by Weeks,
who, alongside many references to “confidential communications,”360
writes that “communications between an attorney and his client, through
an unprofessional person, are privileged; but if they are not wholly of a
professional or confidential nature, it seems that the privilege will not be
allowed,” seemingly equating confidential with professional: that is, they
need not be professional and confidential, belying the hypothesis there
were a difference between the two to the authors of the time.361 Even
Weeks’s most helpful comments on confidentiality for Wigmore —
writing but a few years before that eminence — envision confidentiality
as a test of the professional relationship rather than the communication’s
circumstantial secrecy.362 Seizing upon the odd turn of phrase does little
in the face of the basis of privilege in the confidence one resides in a
professional attorney.363 A confidence is a trust;364 secrecy is only the
expected corollary.365 There is no real objection that Wigmore’s
requirement of confidentiality as a test of the communication’s secrecy
and its maintenance as secret was an innovation springing from his
pursuit of logical perfection rather than an exegesis of the common law,
358. Id.
359. See Drysdale on Confidentiality, supra note 27, § 6:3 & n.5.
360. E.g., WEEKS, supra note 22, § 139, at 289, § 143, at 301, § 144, at 306, § 150, at
317, § 151, at 323-26, § 158, at 337, § 160, at 339, § 161, at 342, § 168, at 361, § 171,
at 365, § 176, at 373.
361. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 144, at 307. Even here, those versed in the discipline
of propositional logic might observe that a phrase in the form ¬(P ∨ Q), as opposed to
¬P ∨ ¬Q, is equivalent to ¬P ∧ ¬Q under De Morgan’s laws. But even legal authors in
English do not write with parentheses, so courts are best served following the ordinary
meaning of the text. See Schane v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Union, 760 F.3d 585, 589-90
(7th Cir. 2014) (“In propositional logic, this move—the rule of inference that not (X or
Y) is equivalent to not X and not Y—is known as one of ‘De Morgan’s Laws.’ See
Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 49 (1993). Formal notation aside, the point
is merely that determining the meaning of or in a sentence is not just a matter of
declaring that the word is disjunctive. Context matters.”).
362. WEEKS, supra note 22, § 143, at 305 (quoted supra note 335).
363. See supra note 133 (protecting all words and paper in any professional
capacity); see also Section II-C (considering major nineteenth-century treatises other
than Bentham).
364. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 312, confidence, noun sense 1 (Oxford Univ. Press
2d ed. (compact) 1989) (“The mental attitude of trusting in or relying on a person or
thing; firm trust, reliance, faith.”).
365. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 3194.
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as numerous others have concluded.366

IV.WIGMORE’S PROBLEMATIC LEGACY ON CONFIDENTIALITY
The purpose of this history is not to critique Wigmore himself for his
choice, and the numerous other authors that have advanced the history
of the privilege subsequent to Wigmore need not be reduplicated.367
Indeed, the earlier encomia to Wigmore and his ultimate hegemony might
give the false impression he was without critics upon publication of his
magnus opus. Yet even those lauding Wigmore’s “monumental
contribution to the law of privileges” in the decades that immediately
followed nonetheless allowed that “[i]t may be that Wigmore . . . has
conduced to the current confusion by his emphasis on strictly utilitarian
bases for the privileges—bases which are sometimes highly conjectural
and defy scientific validation.”368 Roalfe identifies a series of frequent
complaints registered by Wigmore’s contemporaries, most notably his
“advocacy of certain principles of law by statements that were neither
logical nor supported by the courts.”369 But in the balance, Roalfe (as with
other criticisms) concluded that Wigmore’s iconoclastic approaches were
constructive, forcing practitioners into better practice and encouraging
courts to reexamine hoary old assumptions.370
Drysdale (and, presumably, Rice, who placed Drysdale’s work in his
epochal twentieth-century treatise) puts more weight than can be
sustained in the omissions of earlier authorities: there is some meaning to
confidentiality beyond mere identity with the attorney-client
relationship. But the relation is one of reasonable expectancy of
confidentiality enjoyed by the client, which animated the reasoning of
Lord Brougham and all those who — as has been shown, everyone —
credited his wisdom. To be confidential for purposes of attorney-client
privilege, the communication must be made within the attorney’s
professional confidence, and nothing that happens thereafter — nor atthe-time unknown eavesdroppers — should dislodge that unassailable
principle, other than the client’s intent to make the privileged
communication known generally. Negligence will not do; recklessness
will not do; intentionality has legal meaning and is the only proper test
under Lord Brougham’s rationale.371 Wigmore’s complaint that any client
will claim such an intent gets no mileage,372 for of course every client is
366. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
367. See supra note 23.
368. Louisell, supra note 23, at 111-12; accord Gardner, supra note 23, at 458-59.
369. Roalfe, supra note 228, at 285.
370. Id. at 286.
371. The confusion has led to a strained meaning of “waiver” of privilege. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 331 at 508-09 (“The term ‘waiver’ used to describe by what means
the privilege has been lost is singularly infelicitous.”); see, e.g., Sunshine, Common
Interest, supra note 16, at 834.
372. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2327 at 638 (“A privileged person would
seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the
situation.”).
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entitled to expect secrecy, as Wigmore himself agreed.373 He simply
disagreed with the outcome in certain cases, and acted as a legislator unto
himself to reform the law to comply with this sense of principle. Bentham,
the great nullifier of privilege, might perhaps be heard whispering in
Wigmore’s ear.
The Wigmorean notion that privilege might be lost because of
eavesdroppers, misdirected mail, or thieves was thus met with
considerable disbelief.374 Yet Wigmore prevailed, and accidental or
intentional interlopers and felons were allowed to break the privilege
under the common law of the United States.375 Ultimately, Congress
bestirred itself to demand a revision of the rule of attorney-client
privilege, a power it has withdrawn from the judiciary and reserved to
itself, of which this author has written at great length elsewhere.376 Yet
the revisions as approved did not address fully the matter of Wigmore’s
innovation of confidentiality as secrecy being a prerequisite to an
assertion of privilege, and the costs to clients and the legal profession
have continued apace.377 To date, therefore, Wigmore’s mistaken rule of
requiring confidentiality qua secrecy is neither dead nor moribund, but
unfortunately proves a vital dictate in modern cases, even in the wake of
the reforms Congress demanded and approved.378
Such was Wigmore’s influence that a mere three years after his
publication the nation’s then-leading law review might self-assuredly
state that it makes no difference whether a communication was made to
an attorney or not if there were a third party of any kind to abrogate the
“confidence.”379 Recall the treacherous attorney, whom the nineteenth
century sources agreed, pace Taylor, to be disabled from betraying his
client.380 Yet if Wigmore is taken as his word (as he undoubtedly was381),
then counsel wishing to triumph in a betrayal need only surreptitiously
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., Louisell, supra note 23, at 113-14 & n.58a (evincing contemporary
disbelief); Roalfe, supra note 228, at 284-85 (summarizing same); see also, e.g., Smith
v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (expressing continuing
disbelief many decades later).
375. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 7475 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
376. See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary to Fed. R. Evid. 501, Senate Report
No. 93–1277; see also FED R. EVID. 501; Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag,
supra note *, Part III.
377. See Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag, supra note *, Part VI.
378. See id. at Part III.
379. Rodgers, supra note 204, at 70. (“Generally speaking, before the statement to
the attorney will be accorded the dignity of privilege, it must be made in private. It
must, in other words, be confidential and made under such circumstances as naturally
call for confidence. . . . In all such cases, therefore, the statement may be proven the
same as though made to one not an attorney or counselor.”); id. at 71 (“The idea of
privilege shields the attorney only as to confidential information. As to facts that are
otherwise competent and proper, the attorney not only may testify, but can be
compelled to do so.”).
380. See supra notes 217-224 and accompanying text.
381. Chafee Jr., supra note 19; see supra text accompanying note 19.
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install an eavesdropper or record a conversation — or simply supply
professional confidences to a third party — to achieve that end through
another. A legal adversary might hire skilled eavesdroppers to bug a legal
office or burglars to steal an attorney’s files, and Wigmore’s rule would
not exclude the fruits of these calculated, dastardly, and criminal
devices.382 Such a rule is pragmatically, ethically, and morally
unjustifiable,383 and it can be only Wigmore’s literalistic dedication to his
underlying logical principles and the outré nature of such issues in his
time that might have led him to such an extravagant conclusion.384 No
more tenable, it has proven, is the idea that purported negligence by the
attorney or client that allows for an eavesdropper or other later
interceptor should be treated any differently than perfidious attorneys or
thieves in the night.385 Attorney-client privilege, as proposed by Lord
Greenough, ought to follow the client’s (reasonable) intent,386 as surely as
an assailant’s intent follows the bullet.387

V.CONCLUSION
In his early and influential tome on mythology, Thomas Bulfinch
quotes Lord Byron in describing Athena (“Pallas,” another of her epithets)
and her virginal emergence, equating them with the birth of America
(“Columbia”) herself:
Can tyrants but by tyrants conquered be, and freedom find no champion
and no child such as Columbia saw arise when she sprung forth a Pallas,
armed and undefiled? Or must such minds be nourished in the wild, deep
in the unpruned forest, ‘midst the roar of cataracts, where nursing nature
smiled on infant Washington? Has earth no more such seeds within her
breast, or Europe no such shore? 388

382. See, e.g., Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. at 1577 (considering the
hypothetical of a burglar of client files attempting to abrogate privilege and rejecting
as unjust the outcome of privilege being lost in such circumstance).
383. See id.
384. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2285, at 3185.
385. See Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag, supra note *, Part IV.
386. As noted earlier, a client’s unreasonable intent cannot support privilege: for
example, the transmission of confessions to one’s attorney at peak voice across a
crowded public house. Nor could initial intent to consult with counsel in confidence
protect the client’s later apparent intent to disclose the matter—to return to the
example, as if he were to proclaim his confidential conversation in a crowded public
house. But an eavesdropper outside a lawyer’s window, a burglar in the night, a
mistakenly delivered letter, or a paper accidentally and improperly sent by a clerk,
ought not defeat the presumption that the original confidences confided in the lawyer
are to be kept inviolate, whatever their mishandling. To do otherwise would allow
malpractice or malfeasance to accrue to the detriment of the client.
387. State v. Wynn, 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (N.C. 1971) (characterizing as an “accepted
principle of law”); e.g. Poe v. State, 671 A.2d 501, 503 (Md. 1996) (providing trial
instructions).
388. GEORGE GORDON BYRON, 6TH BARON BYRON, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, in 2 THE
WORKS OF LORD BYRON 400-01 (Ernest Hartley Coleridge & Rowland Edmund Prothero
eds. 1899) (quoted with minor typographical differences in BULFINCH, supra note 5 at
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In Wigmore, the American architect of modern privilege law,
perhaps Lord Byron’s question was answered obliquely. Here was no
mind nourished in the wild, but rather one cultivated by the finer of
American institutions, and uniquely set on championing the advancement
of the nation, culture, and law. Suitable to such a paragon, he played his
role both abroad and at home, in military and civilian positions, and as a
practitioner and theorist of jurisprudence. If, as it seems, the invention as
to the confidentiality requirement of privilege sprang Athena-like from
his head, then it was a product of that most American nurture and
innovative nature that inspired the Wigmore of our history books. It is
difficult to compass a man of the law more thoroughly accomplished,
though the examples of legendary judges often outstrip those who enjoy
a more variegated career. There can be little doubt that the likes of
Wigmore’s juristic contemporaries in Harlan (grand-pére et son petit-fils),
Holmes, Hand, Brandeis, and Frankfurter enjoy more storied academic
testimonials as to their impact on the law. Yet Justice Frankfurter himself
published a tribute to Wigmore on the occasion on his centennial,
testifying to the value of the man, his work, and the sadness of his
premature passing,389 a tribute all the more remarkable given the two had
feuded vehemently during Wigmore’s lifetime.390
If Washington may have his apotheosis splayed across the Capitoline
firmament, despite his grievous human sins,391 perchance we may allow
Wigmore his parthenogenesis without rebuke. As the many encomia to
Wigmore both during and after his career testify,392 there is no denying
that he is a lofty figure in the firmament of legal science, worthy of a
Capitoline installation himself.393 This Article comes in the inverse
posture of Marcus Antonius: not to bury Wigmore, but to praise him.394
There is ample evidence over the past century that the requirement of
confidentiality has proven a millstone around the neck of the law,395 but
Wigmore installed that unforeseen millstone in an effort to make sense of
an incoherent tradition of evidentiary law, with his novus organum396 to
18). In this passage, Lord Byron bewails the belligerencies of the Napoleonic Wars and
the absence of effective resistance.
389. Frankfurter, supra note 228.
390. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 280-81.
391. See, e.g., Charles M. Blow, Yes, Even George Washington, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2020), at A21, www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/opinion/george-washingtonconfederate-statues.html [perma.cc/U685-32S2]; Erica Armstrong Dunbar, George
Washington, Slave Catcher, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), at A17, www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/16/opinion/george-washington-slave-catcher.html
[perma.cc/3PPHGF7Y].
392. See Roalfe, supra note 228, at 277 n.*.
393. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 228 (retired justice of the Supreme Court);
Goldberg, supra note 228 (sitting justice of the Supreme Court).
394. See, e.g., supra Section III-A; cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS
CAESAR act 3, sc. 2, ll.73-78 (“Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears; I come
to bury Caesar, not to praise him. The evil that men do lives after them; The good is oft
interred with their bones; So let it be with Caesar.”).
395. See Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag, supra note *, at 645-67.
396. See supra note 255.
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be based on a set of principles of legal science.397 The functional
impracticality of such an innovation could not have been known then, and
indeed did not become fully apparent until the vast proliferation of
documents occasioned by the photocopier and electronically stored
information transformed discovery into a wholly different beast from
when Wigmore wrote.398 That unimaginable technological advances have
made ruin of a single precept of Wigmore’s promulgations of 1904 and
1905 is no indictment.399 Conversely, however, acknowledging that
Wigmore was a rare genius and a giant of his times does not mean his
eminence should stand athwart the advancements of a century and
more.400 It is past time to accept Rice’s exhortation to return to the longtested common law of privilege as to confidentiality prior to Wigmore, as
expressed in the very title of one of Rice’s articles: “the eroding concept
of confidentiality should be abolished.”401

397. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291 at 3204.
398. See Sunshine, Failing to Keep the Cat in the Bag, supra note *, at 685.
399. Cf. id. at 808.
400. See, e.g., id., at 809 (“For all his inequable talents, Wigmore was only a
waypoint, albeit a monumental one, towards the goal in view. The quest for a more
perfect privilege balancing the supreme goals of privacy and truth will go ever on, as it
has for centuries.” (citations omitted)).
401. Rice, supra note 16 (majuscule letters reduced to minuscule).

